









Determinants of Private Saving in Turkey: An Update 
 







The Turkish private saving rate has declined over time and is currently low in 
international comparisons, in particular relative to developing Asia.  This paper provides 
an update and extension of an earlier ERF paper on the same topic, based on 3 additional 
years of household survey data and revised demographic data.  It also brings macro-data 
as well as ISE corporate saving data to bear on questions related developments in total 
and corporate saving.  An equation estimated on macro-data for Turkey for 1988-2009 
suggests that the decline in private saving is related to fiscal consolidation, an increase in 
credit availability, and a reduction in uncertainty (as proxied by inflation) following 
stabilization of the economy.  Household budget survey data for 2004-08 show that a 
wealth effect also appears operative, with households who own their homes responding 
strongly to the business cycle (compared to tenants).  Available corporate saving data for 
firms listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange indicates that the key determinant of 
corporate saving appears to be profits, not dividend payments. The results suggest that, as 
financial deepening resumes after the current crisis, the private saving rate may decline 
again (directly, as credit becomes more widely available, and through a wealth effect if 
this increase in credit contributes to a rise in real estate values).  We also find, based on 
Turkstat demographic projections, that demographic changes—a reduction in the youth 
dependency ratio combined with an increase in the old-age dependency ratio—will be at 
best neutral for the private saving rate.  Meanwhile, reforms to social security  may 
stimulate private saving over time, but this is uncertain as the social security reform also 
includes a lengthening of the contribution period, which should reduce private saving for 
retirement. The study concludes with policy prescriptions. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
Turkey appears to belong to the set of countries that, other than in crisis times, have 
relatively low domestic saving rates, and relatively high current account deficits.   Policy 
makers  have been concerned about this low saving rate, and in search of measures to 
increase it, both with a view of increasing “domestic resource mobilization” and hence 
resources for investment and growth, and reducing the current account deficit, a main 
source of vulnerability, as demonstrated most recently in 2008.   
 
While the Turkish current account deficit fell by two thirds in 2009 under the impact of 
the  global crisis, Turkish history suggests that it will increase again as international 
conditions improve, hence the current account, and therefore the shortfall of saving 
compared to investment, remains a source of concern.   
 
Turkish investment is relatively low in international comparisons, and one motivation for 
raising domestic saving is to raise investment.   The recent literature suggests that one 
channel through which this could happen in the context of an open capital account (where 
the link between investment and saving is severed) is if equity stakes by domestic 




     
                                                 
1  Aghion, Comin, and Howitt (2006) provide a model where higher domestic saving allows local 
entrepreneurs to take an equity stake in projects.  This mitigates an agency problem and as a result 
encourages foreign investors, with the technical know-how, to participate in such projects.   4 
While Turkey’s saving rate has been the subject of considerable concern, it should be 
noted that it compares unfavorably mostly in comparison with high-saving Asian 
countries.  Turkey’s national saving rate is comparable to that in Central and Eastern 
Europe and is not much lower than that in the EU, or the Western Hemisphere countries.  
The situation is similar for the private saving rate.  One might say that developing Asia is 
the outlier, not Turkey.    
 
The contrast between countries like Turkey and developing Asia can perhaps best be 
understood in terms of research on the “allocation puzzle”— the mystery of why capital 
flows from countries with high marginal product of capital and high productivity growth 
(such as China) to countries with low marginal product of capital and low productivity 
growth.  Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) add distortions to incentives to save and invest to 
the neoclassical growth model and show that explaining the allocation puzzle requires 
distortions to saving that are strongly correlated with productivity growth.  Countries like 
China score very poorly on the “saving wedge”—i.e. they appear to tax saving, while 
also having high productivity growth.  A possible explanation for such saving wedges is 
poor financial intermediation in low income countries (the countries that also have high 
productivity growth).  The inability of consumers to obtain loans from the financial sector 
makes for high precautionary saving as well as an inability to move consumption 
forward.  Corporate saving would also be higher in the absence of bank lending.    
 
Turkey, in contrast to China and other high-saving Asian countries, fits the neoclassical 
paradigm better, having both relatively high productivity growth and being a recipient of   5 
capital flows on average.  There does not seem to be a “tax” on saving which would 
cause saving to be low, given the high reliance on consumption rather than income taxes 
and the relatively well-developed banking sector.   There would be no point trying to 
emulate China when it comes to the reasons for its high household saving rate, such as its 
undeveloped domestic financial system and general high level of social insecurity.  Other 
policy avenues would have to be pursued, and we explore these in this paper.   
 
The recent Turkish context is that of a successful stabilization of the fiscal accounts and 
of inflation after the deep financial crisis of 2001, in the context of an IMF program.  
Policy credibility took some time to be established, and it was not until 2004 that 
expectations of default and inflation, as well as real interest rates, declined to moderate 
levels.  The global context of saving glut and low interest rates were also supportive of 
these trends, with gross capital inflows (i.e. before reserve build-up by the banking sector 
including the Central Bank) of over $150 billion (cumulative) in the period from 2004 
through 2007.  Credit, real estate and consumption booms followed,
2 even though Turks 
remained skeptical of the future as indicated by consumer confidence indicators. 
3
                                                 
2 Consumer credit rose from around 4% of total private consumption in 2003, to some 15% at the end of 
2007.  For consumer loans, the increase started relatively early, in 2003.  Housing loans start to increase 
substantially in 2005.  Overall, credit to the private sector does not pick up noticeably until 2004.  2004 is 
also the year real interest and inflation fall to around 10 percent.  Housing prices bottomed out in 2003 and 
recorded large increases every year thereafter, through 2007.   
   At 
3 In particular during 2004-05, when the largest decline in saving was observed, the CNBC-e indicator of 
“consumer expectation” showed more persons expected the economic situation and their finances to 
deteriorate rather than to improve over the next year.  In theory, this should have called for an increase in 
saving, not a decrease, following the argument of Campbell (1987).  Indicators of “consumer sentiment” 
and “consumer confidence” remained stronger for longer, but these indicators reflected the current appetite 
to buy durable goods as well as the current financial situation of respondents, rather than purely 
expectations of the future.  Similarly, expectations for employment (naturally, the major source of income 
growth) from Turkstat show that expectations were rather gloomy, with more people expecting the job 
situation to deteriorate than to improve starting in early 2004.   The same is true for purchasing power as of 
mid-2004 and the general economic situation starting the second quarter of 2005.   
   6 
the same time, with oil prices increasing, Turkey experienced declining terms of trade, 
adding to its current account deficit and reducing saving. 
4
 
   The story fits theory—since 
the usual suspects—fiscal stabilization, credit boom, real estate boom, terms of trade, and 
reversals therein match trends in saving.  The aim of this paper is to provide a more 
formal analysis of saving developments in which policy recommendations can be 




Earlier econometric studies on the Turkish private saving rate are Ozcan, Gunay, and 
Ertac (this journal; 2003) (henceforth OGE) covering the period 1968-1994; IMF (2007) 
                                                 
4 Initially the decline in the terms of trade was stymied by high export prices for Turkish goods (owing to 
the strength of the euro), so it is not until 2006-07, that the terms of trade decline significantly.      7 
covering the period 1980-2005.  These studies focus on the role of macro-economic 
variables, such as growth, the terms of trade, credit (and its rate of change), inflation (a 
proxy for uncertainty), and public saving.  The studies generally find the expected effects, 
in line with both theoretical predictions and earlier panel-data results (the seminal study 
in this area is Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén, 2000).  For the latest boom episode, 
IMF (2007) finds that the 8% of GDP decline in the (inflation-adjusted) private saving 
rate in Turkey between 2001-05 is largely explained by the increase in the public saving 
rate (a contribution of -7% of GDP), the decline in inflation (a contribution of -3%) and 
an increase in growth (a contribution of 6%). 
5  For dependency ratios the Turkey-
specific studies do not find statistically significant effects, but this could simply reflect 
lack of variation in the data.  Van Rijckeghem and Ucer (2009) try to explain the decline 
in saving after Turkey’s economy stabilized.  They study the role of improved prospects 
by referring to consumer confidence indices, and come out favoring an explanation based 
on the rapid expansion of credit instead.  They use household survey data for 2004-05 to 
investigate the role of social security and health insurance and homeownership, inter alia, 
based on a specification similar to that of Chamon and Prasad (2008). 
6
                                                 
5 The strong role of government saving likely reflects the effect of reduced crowding out of lending to the 
private sector and of improved credibility of policies, which brought down real interest rates.  The 
alternative explanation, of  “Ricardian equivalence”, is unlikely in the Turkish case given that assumptions 
underlying Ricardian equivalence do not hold in the Turkish case, inter alia, because of the existence of 
liquidity constraints.   
  They find 
evidence that self-employed and those with higher health spending risk had higher saving 
than other households—consistent with the precautionary saving motive.  They also find 
6 Aktas and others and Yilmazlar (both May 2010), in studies prepared independently from ours which we 
received as we went to press, also study household saving and consumption decisions based on household 
survey data.  Aktas and others use the same Household Budget Survey data as we do, covering in addition 
2003 and focus on various definitions of saving, including expenditures for jewelry, durable goods, and 
health and education expenditures.  Yilmazlar uses the new Survey of Consumer Finances conducted in 
2008.  See Adaman and others (2009).     8 
that households owning their home reduced their saving more than tenants.  In the 
context of rapidly rising real estate prices, this is consistent with the existence of a wealth 
effect.     
 
This paper revisits the question of substitutability between private and public saving and 
that of the role of social security and health insurance and homeownership, with more 
recent data.   
 
We start out with the relevant literature survey, taking care to discuss results relevant to 
the Turkish case (section 2).  We continue by establishing the relevant stylized facts for 
Turkey (section 3) and place the Turkish domestic saving rate in international 
comparison.  We discuss trends public and private saving, including a separate discussion 
of trends in household and corporate saving.  We then proceed to study determinants of 
private saving (section 4), both based on time-series data (1988-2009) and on household 
survey data (2004-2008).  Next we surmise on the future of the private saving rate, based 
on projections for access to credit, demographics, and a qualitative analysis of the recent 
social security reform (section 5).  In Section 6, we discuss policy measures that could 
help to raise the national saving rate, as well as other policies that would reduce the 
current account deficit and Turkey’s vulnerability to sudden stops.  Section 7 concludes. 
  
2.  Literature review: On the micro and macro determinants of private saving  
   9 
In this section, we review both the theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants 
of the private saving rate to set the stage for the discussion to follow in the remainder of 
this paper.  This section can be skipped by readers familiar with the literature on saving.  
We first review the main theories of household saving and their predictions for the effect 
of key macro-economic and demographic variables on household saving.  Given the 
absence of an established theory on corporate saving, we touch only briefly on this topic. 
We then report findings from available comprehensive studies as well as some more 
recent ones of particular interest.   
 
2.1 – Theories of household and corporate saving  
Modern consumption theory starts with the presumption that consumers like to smooth 
out consumption over time, whether over the life-cycle (Modigliani-Brumburg, 1954) or 
in the face of temporary fluctuations to income (the permanent income hypothesis of 
Friedman, 1957).  Models have become increasingly realistic over time, with the 
recognition of a precautionary saving motive (for risk-averse consumers), liquidity 
constraints, and hyperbolic discounting.  “Buffer-stock saving” models, which combine a 
precautionary saving motive with impatient consumers, fit many stylized facts well. 
7
                                                 
7 The literature on household saving is well-developed, and can be found in standard textbooks such as 
Romer (2001). 
   
We discuss these various models briefly below, with special focus on what they may 
have to say for factors at play in the case of Turkey, notably demographic transition; 
terms of trade; government saving; growth; interest rates; liquidity, in particular the role 
of revolving credit; and wealth effects.     10 
 
Life-cycle saving (Modigliani-Brumburg, 1954):  This theory suggests that consumers 
smooth consumption over a lifetime.  As a result saving will be high when incomes are 
high (during working-age), and there will be dissaving after retirement.  In the absence of 
a bequest motive, saving of any individual is zero over a lifecycle.  And in the absence of 
growth or demographic change, aggregate saving will be zero as well.  Yet, growth and 
changes in the population structure have implications for aggregate saving.  If 
productivity growth makes the young richer than the old, saving by the young (who now 
need to finance higher consumption after retirement) will be greater than dissaving by the 
old.  Thus, aggregate  saving will increase with growth. This is referred to as the 
Modigliani’s “aggregation effect”.  This feature of lifecycle saving is often invoked to 
explain the strong empirical correlation between growth and saving.   
 
Similarly, aggregate saving is affected by demographic transition, i.e. the decline in 
mortality and fertility rates.  Life-cycle theories predict a rise in saving as the youth-
dependency ratio declines in the latter stages of demographic transition (Lee and Mason, 
2006).  There are three phases in demographic transition.  Early on, mortality falls, which 
leads to more surviving children.  This can cause saving to decline.  In the intermediate 
phase, as fertility continues to decline, the youth-dependency ratio declines.  The 
resources that are freed as a result (and which could be saved or consumed) are called the 
first demographic dividend. 
8
                                                 
8 Formally, if adults with households with fewer children have more resources available over a life-time, 
and these additional resources are consumed by the adults themselves (rather than on children’s education 
for example), consumption smoothing implies that consumption will also be higher after retirement, and 
hence saving for retirement will have to be higher (Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber, 1999; Scholt, 
 In the late phase, an older working age population, which   11 
also faces greater longevity and can no longer rely on children to take care for them in 
old age, saves to accumulate assets for retirement, unless it believes government will 
provide for its needs. This increase in saving is called the second demographic dividend. 
9
 
 In Section 5 of the paper, we use these predictions to extrapolate the Turkish saving rate 
into the future.   
The life-cycle hypothesis also predicts that windfall gains on wealth (e.g., a rise in the 
stock market or housing prices) will be consumed over the remainder of the life-time.   
This wealth effect is in theory different for housing and financial assets, and depends on 
age, being stronger for the elderly for whom the windfall would be consumed in fewer 
years.  Some have suggested that housing wealth isn’t wealth (Buiter, 2006), because 
cashing in on this wealth requires downsizing to smaller or less well-located housing.  
Only those “long” housing, in the sense that they (plan to) use less housing services than 
they own, are better off when house prices increase (e.g., the elderly).  Families who 
don’t own their home, or who plan to purchase a larger home, are worse off.  These 
implications are testable in the Turkish case by comparing saving of households who own 
their home with those who don’t.  Economy-wide there will only be a positive effect of 
higher house prices on consumption, if households are, on average, “long” housing.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Seshadri, and Khitatrakun, 2006; Skinner, 2007).  While such persons will spend more (and dissave more) 
after retirement, this effect will not be felt until later, and savings increases during the transition.  A caveat 
here is that parents may well use these resources for their children (e.g. education) rather than themselves, 
that is, they would tend to substitute the quality of children for quantity.  In that case there would be no 
need for greater retirement saving to allow consumption smoothing.     
9 Formally, children are a substitute for monetized saving because they make transfers to their parents in 
old age (the household demand model; see Schultz, 2004).  This means that adults who have fewer children 
now need to provide for their retirement themselves.  Such adults will dissave more after retirement, but 
this effect will not be felt for a while, so that aggregate saving increases in the transition.  The impact on 
saving is accentuated as the result of greater longevity, which implies a need for higher assets to finance 
retirement.    12 
 
Permanent-income hypothesis or PIH (Friedman, 1957):  In this theory, consumption 
equals permanent (as opposed to current) income, which takes into account longer-term 
income expectations, and hence is relatively smooth.  Transitory income shocks have 
only a small impact on consumption, and are mostly absorbed as saving or dissaving.   
 
A well-known testable implication of the permanent income hypothesis is that 
movements in saving should anticipate movements in income (Campbell, 1987), i.e. 
people should save when they expect their incomes to decline in the future, and dissave 
(or save less) when they expect them to increase.   This follows directly from 
consumption smoothing motive, i.e. high saving today being necessary to allow 
consumption to remain unchanged when incomes fall in the future. Brought to the data, 
the implication is that saving will decline when consumer confidence is high.  We use 
this approach later in the Turkish context.   Furthermore, when current growth  is 
considered an indication of future growth, people will expect future income to be greater 
than income today, and will dissave, following the same argument as above.  Put 
differently, growth today and in the future will raise permanent income (and 
consumption) more than it raises current income, depressing saving.  This logic applies to 
workers with a substantial fraction of their working life ahead of them.  For older 
workers, permanent income will not change much in response to higher growth, resulting 
in little change in consumption.  For those workers, growth in current incomes then 
increases saving (Jappelli and Pagano, 1997, provide a good exposition; see also Caroll 
and Weil, 1994).    13 
 
The PIH also suggests that effects of changes in the terms of trade (hence in incomes) 
on consumption will be smoothed over time, if these changes are expected to be 
temporary, and will be absorbed as changes in saving.  For example, saving will decline 
in response to a temporary negative terms of trade shock, but then recover after the shock 
is over. In contrast, consumption fully responds to a permanent decline in the terms of 
trade, with no impact on saving.   
 
The PIH, under certain assumptions, implies “Ricardian equivalence”—the idea that 
private saving will offset changes in public saving  one for one.  If public saving 
increases because of higher taxes (or lower transfers), but this is expected to lead to lower 
future taxes, agents’ life-time budget constraint, and hence consumption is unaffected and 
private saving declines (since disposable income declines).  If public saving increases 
because of lower spending and this cut in spending is expected to be permanent, agents 
have higher life-time resources and increase private consumption by an amount equal to 
the reduction in public spending.   Private saving again declines.  According to the 
theory, agents also adjust their bequests to offset the effect of future taxes on future 
generations (Barro, 1974).  However, the PIH only holds in the absence of liquidity 
constraints, when agents are risk-neutral (or are able to insure against risk at actuarial 
cost), government spending is unproductive and agents plan to leave bequests.  It also 
requires changes in government spending to be permanent, and changes in taxes not to 
lead to offsetting changes in spending over time.  These assumptions are rarely met in the 
real world, but Ricardian equivalence is such a persuasive theoretical concept that it often   14 





The impact of changes in the real interest rate is typically studied in a simple two-
period version of this model in which agents either borrow or lend in a first period as a 
function of the path of their labor income (e.g., borrowing if incomes are increasing) and 
interest rates.  While one might intuitively think that increases in interest rates will lead to 
increases in saving, this is not necessarily the case because changes in interest rates have 
both a substitution and an income effect.  An increase in interest rates makes delaying 
consumption more attractive (the substitution effect).  This effect goes in the same 
direction for lenders and borrowers, that is, both will tend to save more (borrow less) in 
the initial period when interest rates increase.  This is the effect one intuitively expects.   
 
But there is also an income effect on consumption, which affects borrowers and lenders 
differently.  The income effect of an increase in interest rates is positive for those lenders 
who now earn more interest income and hence can consume more in both periods, and 
negative for borrowers, who have to pay more interest.  Overall, the impact of an increase 
in interest rates on consumption in the initial period is uncertain for lenders, and negative 
for borrowers (they will consume less and borrow less).  Another interesting aspect is the 
responsiveness of saving to interest rates at low levels of income.  Increasing saving in 
                                                 
10 When these assumptions are not met (e.g. when there is precautionary saving and taxes are a function of 
income), a cut in taxes today financed by future taxes will lead to some increase in consumption today (and 
the offset between public and private saving will be less than one for one).  This is due to the fact that 
income taxes reduce the volatility of future (after-tax) income, therefore reducing the need for 
precautionary saving.  Similarly, when some households plan not to leave bequests, they will raise their 
consumption in the face of a tax cut which is to be financed by higher taxes on future generations.   15 
response to higher interest rates is difficult when incomes are already near subsistence 
since first period consumption cannot be compressed (Ogaki, Ostry, Reinhart, 1996).  
Inter-temporal substitution is almost impossible and the substitution effect non-existent.
11
 
   
Precautionary saving:  In this theory, households save because they are risk-averse, i.e. 
the greater the uncertainty about future income, the greater the saving (see Romer, 2001 
for a good exposition).  Inflation is often used, in studies of private saving, as a proxy for 
uncertainty about future income.  Rural incomes may be more uncertain than urban ones, 
in which case precautionary saving would fall with urbanization. Precautionary saving 
incidentally is one reason for not observing a rundown of wealth to zero during old age 
(in addition to a bequest motive):  wealth (in the form of home ownership, for instance) is 
insurance against a catastrophic event.  Since people do not know when they will pass 
away, on average people die leaving bequests.   
 
Liquidity constraints:  In this theory, households save more when they are liquidity-
constrained.  Liquidity constraints act both directly to restrict consumption below what 
consumption smoothing implies, and indirectly, as the possibility of the liquidity 
constraint becoming binding in the future makes shifting resources to the future (saving) 
more desirable. A relaxation of liquidity constraints makes higher consumption in the 
present possible, but at the expense of lower consumption in the future.  Liquidity 
constraints are captured by the amount of credit  available in the economy, and 
                                                 
11 In technical terms, the marginal utility of income is very high around subsistence levels, hence the 
willingness to substitute consumption over time is very low.  With consumption tracking income closely, 
there is also no income effect.   16 
sometimes by variables such as loan-to-value ratios for home purchases. 
12
 
  The amount 
of credit available in the economy is likely influenced by housing prices, if higher 
collateral improves access to credit (e.g., through home equity loans).  Households may 
wish to access additional credit resulting from higher house prices (i.e., withdraw equity 
from their homes) if they were credit-constrained before.   
Buffer-stock saving.  Such models combine a precautionary saving motive, impatience 
and sometimes a liquidity constraint (Deaton, 1991; Carroll, 1992, 2001, 2004).  
Households target a wealth/permanent income ratio to act as a buffer in case of adverse 
income developments.  More patient households and households which are more risk-
averse or face higher uncertainty target a higher wealth/income ratio.  Factors that reduce 
the need for precautionary wealth—such as lower uncertainty or a relaxation of liquidity 
constraints or a positive shock to wealth—lead to dissaving, until the new target wealth 
is reached.  After the target is reached, precautionary saving continues as before.  These 
factors therefore have only a temporary effect on saving, albeit one that could last several 
years (Carroll, 2001; 2006).  
 
Buffer stock saving models match certain features of the data well, notably the close 
correlation between consumption and income growth; the fact that most households save 
little, and that wealth is concentrated; and the correlation between wealth holdings and 
uncertainty.  The buffer-stock model of saving seems to explain saving behavior for ages 
between mid-20s to mid-40s (Gourinchas and Parker, 2002).     
 
                                                 
12 See e.g. Jappelli and Pagano (1994).   17 
Hyperbolic discounting:  Hyperbolic discounting refers to a situation where people 
simultaneously use a high discount rate for discounting the near future and a low discount 
rate for discounting the distant future, i.e. they act impatient when discounting the near 
future but patient when discounting the far future.  For instance, when offered the choice 
between $50 now and $100 a year from now, many people will choose the immediate 
$50. However, given the choice between $50 in five years, or $100 in six years almost 
everyone will choose $100 in six years, even though that is the same choice seen at five 
years' greater distance.  This also means preferences are dynamically inconsistent:  after 5 
years, people will reverse their preferences, prefering $50 in year five over $100 in year 
six.  Hyperbolic discounting helps to explain seemingly irrational behavior, such as 
procrastination and impulsive behavior (lack of self-control).  Importantly in our context, 
it also helps to explain over-use of credit card (over-use in the sense that people will 
eventually regret having taken on credit) and helps to explain why widespread 
availability of credit cards reduces saving even of those who are not liquidity-constrained 
(i.e., those who have financial assets) in the first place (Laibson, 1997).     
 
Habit persistence.  When real income increases (decreases), spending may not rise (fall) 
immediately; or when taxes increase, reducing disposable income, spending may not 
decline (Carroll, Overland and Wei, 2000).  Habit persistence explains the stylized fact of 
sluggishness in consumption.   Persistence in consumption habits causes a temporary 
decline in saving in case of a temporary shock (as under the PIH), but also implies a 
reduction in saving which persists for some time in the case of a permanent negative  
shock (unlike under the PIH where saving does not respond to a permanent shock).    18 
Persistence in consumption habits is consistent with the positive correlation between 
growth and saving because growth in incomes is not immediately followed by growth in 
spending.   Habit persistence also implies a negative relationship between public and 
private saving, when private consumption is persistent in the face of a change in taxes. 
Thus, an increase in taxes (an increase in public saving), which reduces disposable 
income, will be associated with a reduction in private saving if consumption is persistent. 
 
Corporate saving. There is no well-developed theoretical literature on corporate saving 
akin to that for household saving.  It is recognized that the main motivation for corporate 
saving (retained earnings) is to finance investment, and it has been suggested that 
corporate saving would be higher when investment opportunities are particularly 
promising but other sources of finance (equity, debt or bank loans) are not available or 
more expensive.  Another determinant is the tax treatment of dividend income versus 
capital gains tax.  In the case of tax discrimination, with higher dividend income tax than 
capital gains tax, there would be an incentive for the firm to retain earnings, since the 
capital gains resulting from retaining earnings would be taxed at a lower rate (Poterba, 
1987; see Aron and Muellbauer (1999) for a literature survey).     
 
2.2 – Empirical findings on determinants of saving 
Several researchers have developed the insights gained from the household saving 
theories into an empirically-motivated macro literature, focusing on the determinants of 
both within- and cross-country variance in private saving rates. The most comprehensive   19 
effort to date on saving is by the World Bank “Saving Across the World.” The project 
aimed to explain the variation in private savings rates across countries; to establish the 
direction of causality between saving and growth (the above mentioned study by Rodrik, 
2000 forms part of the study); and to draw policy implications on how to raise national 
saving rates.  The study includes an overview chapter (Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and 
Servén, 2000a; henceforth LSS), which reviews earlier studies in the literature, as well as 
a comprehensive panel-data analysis of determinants of private saving (as a share of 
private disposable income), covering 150 countries over the period 1965-1994, and 
estimated with system GMM (Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén, 2000b).  Private 
savings data in this study is inflation-adjusted, as it should be. Another comprehensive 
panel-data study on (national) saving is provided by IMF (2005).  
 
Two studies focus specifically on Turkey, by Ozcan, Gunay, and Ertac (2003) 
(henceforth OGE) covering the period 1968-1994, and by IMF (2007) covering the 
period 1980-2005.  Both studies report results for unadjusted and inflation-adjusted 
private saving rates, but we focus on the latter below.   
 
In what follows, we draw extensively on the overview chapter in LSS and literature 
review in IMF (2007), as well as the subset of results of LSS for developing countries 
and the subset of results for IMF (2005) for emerging markets.  
 
Income 
   20 
All panel studies reviewed above as well as those contained in the various literature 
surveys find this variable to be an important determinant of saving/disposable income, 
with a positive coefficient.  This finding is consistent with both the original Keynesian 
formulation for the consumption function (with a declining average propensity to 




Studies typically find a statistically positive and significant effect for real per capita GDP 
growth on savings.  This is the case for the panel data studies of LSS, IMF (2005) as well 
as several earlier studies. 
13
                                                 
13 This is however not the case for all studies, for example Haque, Pesaran and Sharma (1999).  See Loayza 
et. al. (2000a), De Serres and Pelgrin (2002), and IMF (2007) for surveys of results of a large number of 
panel data studies.  
 The findings of a positive coefficient on growth are 
consistent with various theories (e.g, Modigliani’s aggregation effect, habit formation).  
Other methods confirm this finding as well.  Caroll and Weil (1994) provide evidence 
based on US household data that predictable growth in earnings is associated with higher 
saving among the young.  This is the opposite of what one would expect for the young, 
and the authors suggest that habit formation along with uncertainty about future earnings 
is responsible for this result.  Rodrik (2000) studies “growth transitions”, that is 
transitions from low to high growth rates, and finds that “growth transitions tend to be 
followed by significant, and sustained, improvements in saving performance.”  He does 
not, however, specify the mechanism by which growth may be driving saving.  For 
Turkey, studies differ in their findings, with no statistically significant effect in OGE, but 
a statistically significant and large positive coefficient in IMF (2007).   21 
 
Terms of trade 
 
Studies consistently find a positive coefficient on the terms of trade (LSS, IMF (2005), 
and all studies reviewed therein).  As noted in the theoretical literature above, this is what 
one would expect when terms of trade movements are of a temporary nature.  OGE find 




A few studies find a positive coefficient on inflation (LSS; Masson, Bayoumi, and 
Samiei, 1998).  Inflation is a measure of uncertainty, and this result is interpreted as being 
consistent with a precautionary motive for saving.  OGE and IMF (2005) also find this 




Credit tends to be statistically significant in empirical studies, but they differ on the 
specific form—level of credit/GDP vs. change in credit/GDP—which turns out to be 
pertinent.  For instance, LSS  find  a statistically significant role for the level of 
credit/GDP, whereas IMF (2005) finds a role for its change.  Finding a role for the level 
implies that liquidity constraints matter for saving, whereas finding a role only for the 
change in credit/GDP ratio implies that liquidity constraints do not matter, other than   22 
when they change.  The first result is consistent with standard models of liquidity 
constraints, whereas the second result is what one would expect from buffer-stock saving 
models.  In the latter case, a relaxation of liquidity constraints means target wealth can be 
less, and wealth will be drawn down in the transition to a new steady state.  After 
reaching that new steady state, saving recovers.   
 
For Turkey, studies vary in their findings.  OGE found a role for the level of credit/GDP 
ratio in a restricted regression which excluded, inter alia, government saving and 
inflation.  IMF (2005) found that the coefficient on the change in credit/GDP ratio was 
not statistically significant.  This latter result could be caused by multi-collinearity, 
however, since variables highly correlated with credit, such as public savings and 
inflation, are controlled for in the regression.   
Gross and Souleles (2002) provide additional detail on the role of credit.  They find that 
increases in credit limits lead to an immediate rise in debt, and that, consistent with the 
buffer stock saving hypothesis even people starting well below their credit limit, respond 
to the increase in limits.  
 
Real interest rate 
 
Knowing the impact of real interest rates is crucial for informing policy on stimulating 
saving (for instance, to answer questions, such as whether raising the after-tax rate of 
return through tax measures would succeed in raising private savings).  As noted before, 
its impact is ambiguous in theory and depends on  the relative magnitude of the   23 
substitution and income effects.  The real interest rate does not have a statistically 
significant effect in most studies (LSS and studies cited therein and in IMF, 2007).  An 
exception of a study which finds a positive coefficient is Masson et. al. (1998). Both 
studies on Turkey also do not find a statistically significant coefficient on the real interest 
rate.  
 
Further insights are gained by Ogaki, Ostry, and Reinhart (1996), who study the 
intertemporal rate of substitution at different levels of income.  The authors find evidence 
that the intertemporal rate of substitution is low at low levels of income.  In essence, 
saving cannot respond positively to interest rates in poor countries, because first period 
consumption cannot fall below subsistence levels. 
14
 
 This provides an explanation for the 
lack of responsiveness of saving to interest rates in episodes of “financial liberalization” 
(freeing of deposit rates) in low-income countries as well as for the statistical 
insignificance of the real interest rate in panel data studies focusing on developing 




Wealth is not studied explicitly in the panel-data studies reviewed so far, but other studies 
are available.  Some of these studies suggest the existence of a wealth effect on 
                                                 
14 The marginal utility of income is very high around subsistence levels, hence the willingness to substitute 
consumption over time is very low.     24 
consumption. 
15  Studies find a medium-term marginal propensity to consume out of 
housing wealth in the range of 0.04–0.10 and 0.04-0.07 for stock market wealth.  As 
expected, the effect is stronger for the elderly.  Studies disagree on whether the effect is 
stronger for housing or financial wealth. 
16
The finding of a wealth effect has been criticized as spurious (Calomiris, Longhofer, and 
Miles,  2009):  improved economic prospects would increase both consumption and 
housing wealth, so a correlation can be expected in the data between consumption and 
housing wealth, even in the absence of any causal link from housing wealth to 
consumption.  Evidence to that effect comes from instrumental variable estimation which 
finds a zero or small effect from housing wealth on consumption. 
   It is also not clear how long the wealth effect 
lasts.   Some studies find that the wealth effect of stock market prices disappears over 1-3 
years (as cited in Funke, 2002).    
17
Akin (2008) estimates an error correction model for Turkey relating durable and non-
durable consumption to inter alia stock market and housing wealth (controlling for 
  Further evidence 
supporting the interpretation of spurious correlation comes from a study which finds that 
the wealth effect is the same for renters and homeowners, in the UK, suggesting that what 
is really driving consumption is improved prospects (Attanasio and others, 2009).  
                                                 
15 Carroll et. al. (2006); Funke (2002), and Sierminska and Takhtamanova (2007) provide good overviews. 
One well-known study is that of Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005), who construct estimates of housing 
wealth for the 50 US states over 1982-99.   They found a large wealth effect for housing wealth, which was 
also larger than the impact from changes in equity wealth.   
16 For instance, Ludwig and Sløk (2002) estimate a larger effect of stock wealth than housing wealth in a 
panel of 16 OECD countries, whereas Carroll et. al. (2006) and Sierminska and Takhtamanova (2007) find 
the opposite. 
17 Specifically, the quarterly change in log retail sales at the US state level is regressed on the change in log 
wealth, instrumented by lags of log wealth.     25 
disposable income and private sector credit).  She finds evidence that both stock market 




An increase in government saving is associated with lower private saving in all panel-
data studies (LSS, IMF, 2005; all studies reviewed in LSS and IMF, 2007).  In the panel-
data studies offsets are far from complete for developing countries.  For instance, LSS 
and IMF (2005) find offsets of –0.5 and –0.2, respectively, so that one percentage point 
increase in public saving succeeds in raising total saving by 0.5-0.8 percentage point.  
The (partial) offsets could reflect Ricardian effects (in anticipation of lower future taxes), 
but as discussed in the literature review above, might also be the result of a multitude of 
factors such as habit formation (unchanged consumption levels despite higher taxes), a 
boost to credit to the private sector and lower real interest rates, or a reduced need for 
private saving when higher government saving reflects the introduction of programs such 
as social security or unemployment insurance.   
 
For Turkey specifically, OGE (in one specification
18
                                                 
18 The specification that excludes growth, credit and the current account, and defines government as the 
non-financial public sector. 
) and IMF (2007) find very high 
offsets to public saving.  OGE finds a long-run coefficient on public saving of –1.2 
(implying private saving falls more than public saving rises) and IMF (2007) finds –0.7.  
These findings, taken at face value, suggest that an increase in government saving will 




Many studies find evidence of an impact of the youth and old-age dependency ratios (the 
ratio of the number of young or old to the working age population).  For the youth 
dependency ratio, LSS estimate that a 1 percentage point reduction in this ratio is 
associated with a 0.3 percentage point increase in the saving rate in the short-run (0.5 
percentage points in the long-run). 
19
 
  The corresponding figures are 1.4 and 2.8 for the 
old-age dependency ratio.   These variables were not significant in the Turkey-specific 
studies, but this is not too surprising, given the lack of variance in the series.  
Corporate saving 
 
The empirical literature in this area is very sparse.  Poterba (1987) for the US estimates 
an error correction model for aggregate real dividends as a function of earnings and a tax 
discrimination variable (which captures the extent to which taxes paid by households 
would be lower if profits were retained, leading to capital gains, versus distributed), and 
finds these variables to be significant.  The equation also includes Tobin’s q, in order to 
control for profit opportunities, which would lead to higher retention, should external 
finance be more expensive than internal finance, but this variable turns out not to be 
significant.   
                                                 
19 Based on their GMM system estimator for LDCs.  Long-run coefficient is calculated as the short-run 
coefficient divided by one minus the coefficient on lagged saving.   27 
The main reference for developing countries is the study by Aron and Muellbauer (1999) 
on South Africa.  The authors develop models for both the share of profits in national 
income (a function of terms of trade, tax effects and the markup of prices over unit labor 
costs) and the share of corporate saving in profits.  The latter is shown to be influenced 
by inflation, the real interest rate, dividend taxation and financial liberalization.   
 
3.  Turkish Saving Rate in Historical and International Context 
 
In this section, we first provide data on total saving and its components—public and 
private saving, as well as the sub-components of private saving—household saving and 
corporate saving for companies listed on the stock exchange.  We then provide, within 
the limits of available data, international comparisons of the Turkish national and private 
saving rates.  We show that the Turkish domestic and private saving rates are low in 
international comparisons, but that this reflects for the most part an unfavorable 
comparison with China and East Asia, as well as strong cyclicality in Turkey’s private 
saving rate, in particular during the latest growth phase from 2002 through 2006.   
3.1 – Historical Context 
Data 
 
Data are available on a consistent basis since 1998 for total, private and public saving.  
1998 constitutes a break in the data because the NIA revision of 2007, which was   28 
retroactive only to 1998. 
20  For earlier years we used SPO data based on the 1987 NIA 
revision. 
21  The public sector refers to the non-financial public sector.  As is customary 
in the literature, we construct inflation-adjusted private and public saving data to ensure 
the saving data correspond to the real accumulation of assets, rather than just to 




The NIA data do not distinguish between household and corporate saving, the two 
components of private saving, but other data is available which can cast some light on 
trends in these subcomponents.  For households, the data is from the household surveys 




Data on household saving from the household surveys are available for 1994 and 2002-
08. There are important conceptual differences between surveys over time, however, and 
only the surveys starting in 2003 provide comparable data on disposable income, 
spending, and therefore saving. 
24
                                                 
20 Data obtained from SPO’s website. 
  The surveys do not strictly refer to saving in any given 
year, which instead has to be derived from disposable income and spending data.  
Participants are interviewed once a year, with interviews phased in over the course of the 
year, starting in January.  They report on income during the previous 12 months and 
21 The 2008 revision led to an upward adjustment of GDP of over 30% to take into account informal 
activities.  Both consumption and investment were revised upward.  
22 We make this adjustment following the World Bank (1998) methodology.  Inflation adjustment is 
required because in times of high inflation private saving overstates the amount of asset accumulation 
because the underlying assets are being eroded by inflation.  At times of disinflation, this by itself causes an 
illusory decline in the raw private saving data (since private saving was never that high to begin with).  
Public saving, conversely, are understated in the absence of adjustment, as inflation erodes the real value of 
public debt. Total saving does not require an inflation adjustment, since the adjustment on private and 
public saving offset eachother.  
23 Data is available on the Istanbul Stock Exchange website, e.g. ISE TEMETTU_2008_12. 
24 The 2002 data for household saving indicate a household saving rate of 10 percent, versus an unadjusted 
23% saving rate in the NIA.      29 
spending in the last month (Appendix 1).  For this reason, the aggregate saving data 
combine both current and prior year information and do not accurately measure full 
current year saving.     
 
Data is not publicly available on corporate saving in Turkey, though the Central Bank of 
Turkey does compile data on this.  On the other hand, the ISE makes available data on 
corporate saving on its website in the form of data on profits and dividend payments.  
The drawback of this data is its limited scope.  This is most easily demonstrated by 
comparing profits in the ISE listed enterprises with the share of profits estimated in the 
cost side estimates of GDP.  The former averaged 1.3% of GDP during 1999-2008, 
whereas the operating surplus in the cost side estimates of GDP is 50% in 2006. 
25
 
    
In the raw ISE data, profits refer to current year profits and dividends refer to dividends 
paid out from those profits.  These dividends are usually approved and paid out the next 
year, after the company’s annual meeting.  Hence, in order to have a concept of saving 
which could correspond to that in the national accounts, we need to make an adjustment 
to bring all cash flows (profits and dividends) on a same year basis.  We calculate 
corporate saving (retained earnings) as current year profits minus dividend payments paid 
out that year, a concept we refer to as “retained earnings, cash basis”. 
26
                                                 
25 Net operating surplus is a measure of gross (pre-tax) profits, available from the cost side estimates of 
GDP.  It excludes depreciation and includes self-employment income.  It is a residual balancing item in the 
product account and equals gross value added minus indirect taxes paid by producers (net of subsidies 
received) minus compensation of fixed capital minus compensation of employees.   Cost side estimates of 
GDP are only available through 2007.  They have not yet been revised in line with the 2007 NIA revision.     
  Appendix 2 
26 We do not deduct dividends given in the form of stocks, hence implicitly treat these as retained earnings.     30 
provides a summary of the raw data and shows how we constructed retained earnings, 




NIA data indicate that inflation-adjusted private saving was on average 17.3% of GDP 
between 1998-2004, after which it declined sharply to 10% in 2005-06.  The drop from 
peak to trough between 2001-06 was more than 8% of GDP.  Inflation-adjusted private 
saving is estimated to have risen to 13-14% of GDP in 2008-09.   
 
Private and public saving rates are practically mirror images of each other.  This is so for 
a variety of reasons, as discussed in the literature  survey, and does not necessarily 
indicate the presence of Ricardian equivalence.  In the latest episode, for example, it is 
easily argued that the economic crisis caused both the decline in public saving (counter-
cyclical fiscal policy as well as the automatic response of revenues to declining income) 
and increase in private saving (higher uncertainty; less access to credit).  
   31 
 
 
Table 1 provides information on the components of private saving, and contrasts this with 
total private saving from the NIA.   The table shows the household saving rate as a share 
of household disposable income, based on the household survey data of 2004-08 and 
corporate saving by ISE listed firms as a share of GDP.  This data is unadjusted for 
inflation, and hence should be compared with unadjusted private saving data from the 
NIA.   
 
Household saving using this measure showed similar tendencies as total private saving in 
2004-07.  Notably, household saving declined sharply between 2004 and 2005, from 17 
percent of disposable income in 2004 to 10 percent in 2005 (the unadjusted private saving   32 
rate based on NIA data shows a decline from 17 to 13 percent of GDP).  We have argued 
in earlier work (Van Rijckeghem and Ucer, 2009) that this is more likely the result of 
increased availability of credit than of improved consumer confidence and found some 
evidence of the presence of a wealth effect, notably that those owning their home reduced 
their saving more drastically than those who did not (see also below).   
 
Table 1.  Components of Private Saving
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Private saving (%GDP) 16.9 13.1 12.3 13.1 15.1
Household saving (% disposable income) 17.0 10.0 10.3 12.2 7.9
Retained earnings, ISE listed corporates (%GDP) 1.8 1.0 1.8 -0.4 1.5 
 
Saving then remained relatively flat using both sets of data through 2007.  However, the 
data diverge for 2007-08, with the household survey data showing a decline from 12% to 
8% (saving/disposable income), whereas the unadjusted private saving rate based on NIA 
data increases from 13% to 15% of GDP (saving/GDP)—that is there is a large gap in 
what the sources say regarding developments between 2007 and 2008.   
 
Some 2% of GDP of the divergence can be explained based on the behavior of corporate 
saving, which swung from -.4 to 1.5 percent of GDP between 2007 and 2008. 
27
                                                 
27 Indeed, based on the household saving data (a decline of 4% of disposable income) and corporate saving 
data (an increase of some 2% of GDP), we would have expected private sector saving to fall substantially 
(by some 4% of household disposable income), rather than increase as it does in the official statistics (by 
some 2% of GDP).  Part of the reason for the discrepancy probably reflects the fact that household saving 
data do not actually measure saving over the entire year, since they sample people throughout the year.   
  The 
reason for the negative corporate saving in 2007 is related to the bankruptcy of some very 
large media related firms (Medya, Sabah and Sapaz).  These bankruptcies were related to 
tax fines imposed by the tax authorities, rather than the economic situation.   When   33 
looking at a core group of firms that remained listed on the stock exchange throughout 
the period, retained earnings are positive and sizeable in 2007 (Table 2).    
       
             
 
Table 2.  Corporate Profits, Dividends and Saving (% GDP)
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
All firms listed on ISE    
Net profits 1.8 2.0 1.4 -1.6 1.2 1.5 2.1 1.6 2.5 0.4 2.3
Cash dividend (paid following year) 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
Retained earnings 1.2 1.4 1.0 -1.9 1.0 1.1 1.4 0.8 1.5 -0.5 1.4
Retained earnings, cash basis 1.4 1.6 1.0 -1.9 1.0 1.3 1.8 1.0 1.8 -0.4 1.5
 
continuously on ISE since 1998
Net profits 1.7 1.8 1.4 -1.0 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.0 1.7 2.4 1.3
Cash dividend (paid following year) 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.3
Retained earnings 1.1 1.3 1.0 -1.2 1.0 1.3 0.9 0.5 1.1 1.8 1.1
Retained earnings, cash basis 1.7 1.3 0.9 -1.4 1.0 1.4 1.2 0.4 1.2 1.8 0.8 
 
From inspection of Table 2 and also Figure 3 below, the key determinant of corporate 
saving is profits, with dividend payments relatively constant, as a share of GDP.  For 
example, corporate saving declines a lot in the crisis year 2001, becoming very negative, 
tracking profits.    One reason for the stability of dividends is a legal requirement 
(abolished in 2010) that dividend payments (in cash or bonus shares) should be at least 20 
percent of distributable earnings.   
 
   34 
 
3.2 – The International Context  
We now turn to international comparisons.  Figure 4 shows that Turkey’s national saving 
rate has been low over the past decades, by emerging market standards.  A regional 
breakdown (Figure 5), shows that this is largely a reflection of very high and rising 
saving rates in Asian and Middle-East economies.  Turkey’s national saving rate is 
comparable to that in Central and Eastern Europe (chart includes Turkey) and is not much 
lower than that in the EU, or the Western Hemisphere countries. 
28
                                                 
28 According to 2005 WDI data, Turkey has a lower domestic saving rate than the median, ranking 96th out 
of 171 countries.  It has a saving rate similar to that of Italy, Costa Rica, Chile, Pakistan, Israel, Poland, 
France, and higher than in Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, UK, US, Iceland, Lebanon, and most African 
countries.  Countries with higher saving rates include all of Asia, oil-exporters, Switzerland, Netherlands, 
  Also of interest is the 
simultaneous decline in national saving in all country groupings estimated for 2009.     35 
 
The Turkish national saving rate is also about the same as in the Western Hemisphere 
before the increase in commodity prices starting around 2003, which greatly benefited 
most of the commodity-exporting countries there, thereby increasing their savings.  As 
discussed in the theoretical survey above, the latter becomes the typical response to a 
positive but transitory shock to income.  Differences with Middle-East economies are, as 
for the Western Hemisphere countries, also readily explained by terms of trade 
improvements.  It is interesting to observe that Turkey’s saving rate is similar to that in 
Eastern European countries, which have also experienced “credit booms” during the last 
decade, and are in the EU-“convergence club”.  From this perspective, the main question 
therefore is why the Turkish saving rate is so much less than the Asian saving rate.  
Though this is a big puzzle that is yet to be answered fully satisfactorily, high Asian 
saving are often attributed to demographic factors, the precautionary saving motive (in 
conjunction with an inability to smooth consumption through borrowing from the 
banking sector, as mentioned in the introduction), high productivity growth, and high 
returns to investment.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Czech Republic, Ukraine, Argentina, Canada, Germany, and Egypt.  This statistic also suggests that 
Turkey’s saving rate is low but not exceptionally so according to international comparisons.   36 
   37 
 
 
An international comparison of private saving rates is more difficult, because the 
necessary data to compute private saving is not readily available for a global sample.  
Here we rely on results published in IMF (2005), with the drawback that the data ends in 
2004.   
 
The IMF data for comparator countries are based on saving rates unadjusted for inflation, 
hence saving is artificially boosted to the extent high inflation countries are included.  
The data shows that unadjusted private savings have been roughly stable at around 20 
percent of GDP for emerging markets excluding China, East Asia and oil producers.  
Turkey does not fare too badly in comparison to this set of countries, until the year 2002;   38 
saving unadjusted for inflation lay somewhat above comparator countries, while saving 
adjusted for inflation lay somewhat below. 
29
 
  From 2002 onwards, however, Turkish 
private savings declines dramatically.  Also of note, is that the private saving rate in 
Turkey showed large cyclical swings several times in the past (Figure 6).   
Turkish public saving rises in parallel with the decline in private saving, explaining the 
limited decline in overall domestic saving in recent years.  In terms of levels, a 
comparison with other countries based on the same IMF study shows that the Turkish 
public saving rate at the onset of the global crisis compared favorably with other 
emerging markets (over 3% of GDP in Turkey based on unadjusted 2007 data versus a 
modestly negative number (-0.5%) for emerging markets).   
                                                 
29 Comparing unadjusted data provides a rosy picture as Turkish inflation was likely higher than that in 
comparator countries.  Using adjusted data for Turkey on the other hand, biases the comparison in the other 
direction, since data are unadjusted for other countries.   39 
 
If Turkish saving, and in particular private saving, has been low relative to the world 
average, what about broad trends in investment and the current account balance?  WEO 
data indicates that Turkish investment rates, too, have  been low compared to other 




Investment also contracted very sharply in the recent crisis.   
This has kept the average Turkish current account balance close to zero, while showing 
wild fluctuations in the interim, a reflection of Turkey’s near-term macro history, 
characterized by booms followed by busts (Figure 8).  Still, the current account balance 
was worse, on average, vis-à-vis both the emerging markets and mature markets.  An 
exception is Central and Eastern European countries, again EU convergence countries, 
                                                 
30 The figure uses old NIA data until 1997 and revised NIA data thereafter.   40 
most of which have completed EU-accession in recent years (i.e. a first batch in 2004; 






                                                 
31 The literature on the experience of current account dynamics of EU accession countries is large.  For a 
recent take, see Rahman (2008).   41 
 
 
4.  Determinants of private saving in Turkey 
4.1 Economy-wide regressions 
 
In this section we revisit determinants of saving based on 22 years of data, covering 
1988-2009.   We find that the only robust determinants of private saving are government 
saving and the government overall balance (both adjusted for inflation).   
 
We start out by estimating the IMF (2007) specification (column 1, Table 3), though the 
data is different due to the different period studied by the IMF (1980-2005), and the 
revision of the NIA data for data after 1998.  We find similar coefficients as the IMF   42 
study on public saving adjusted for inflation and inflation as measured by the GDP 
deflator (both in size and statistical significance);  Also, like the IMF results, growth in 
the terms of trade, the change in credit, the ex ante real interest rate and the 
unemployment rate are not statistically significant.  On the other hand, we do not find any 
statistically significant effect for per capita GDP growth, nor do we find any evidence of 
long-run dynamics in this first specification (the coefficients on lagged private and public 
saving are statistically insignificant).   For ex ante real interest rates a caveat on the data 
quality is in order, which could explain its lack of significance. Expectations surveys 
which would allow us to calculate true ex ante interest rates are not available except for 
the past few years, and we had to construct ex ante interest rates (nominal interest rates 
minus expected inflation) by assuming expected inflation could be proxied by the average 
of 12-month past and future inflation.  This formulation was suggested by the fact that a 
regression of expected inflation (on which data only becomes available starting in 
January 2002) on past and future inflation proved to be a very good fit (Appendix 4).  
 
We proceed (column 2) to drop some variables in order to gain degrees of freedom with 
the aim of raising these above 15, still less than the normally required 20.  We drop the 
unemployment rate (which given its lack of variability—other than a trend—has little 
information content), lagged public saving, and the ex ante real interest rate, all of which 
were statistically insignificant in column (1).  We replace the growth in the terms of trade 
with the terms of trade index itself (the usual formulation) and add an indicator of 
business confidence as a forward looking variable.   
   43 
These changes make a small difference to the size of the coefficient on public saving, 
which drops from -0.7 to -0.6 in the short-run.  In the long-run, the results imply an even 
smaller effect on private saving (since the coefficient on lagged private saving is more 
negative than in the previous specification), but as before the coefficient on lagged saving 
is not statistically significant at the 5% level.   
 
In this specification the change in credit and the terms of trade become highly statistically 
significant.   These results are in line with the general findings in the literature and are as 
expected for Turkey.  While the change in credit/GDP becomes significant, the 
coefficient on public saving remains sizeable, suggesting that public saving does not 
affect private saving purely through credit availability. 
32
 
    
Business confidence is marginally significant (negative sign, as expected), and growth in 
per capita GDP almost so (positive sign as expected).  We believe this result may be 
spurious however, reflecting the high positive correlation between GDP per capita growth 
and confidence.   
 
So as not to make too much of this last finding, which could be spurious, we next drop 
the confidence variable (column 3).   Results are hardly affected by dropping this variable 
and we adopt the specification in column 3 as our key specification. 
                                                 
32 Kannan (2008) has shown that fiscal variables affect real interest rates.  In a cross-section of countries, 
he found a significant relationship between domestic debt and ex post real interest rates.   Also, in Turkey 
specific regression, the foreign exchange risk premium in the interest parity condition was a function of the 
budget deficit.  Finally, the change in debt had an adverse impact on the probability of that the economy 
would transition from a high to low inflation rate regime, pressuring nominal interest rates.  
   44 
 
 
Table 3.  Turkish Private Saving Equation, 1988-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IMF replication Parsimonious Key specification Different
coefficient std error adding confidence fiscal variable
Constant 16.54 6.63 ** 11.80 6.00 * 0.36 3.37   4.87 6.58
Lagged private saving (%GDP) -0.09 0.31   -0.23 0.13 * -0.31 0.17 * -0.03 0.17
Public Savings (%GDP; adjusted) -0.73 0.33 ** -0.63 0.15 *** -0.63 0.16 ***
Overall balance (%GDP; adjusted) -0.54 0.14 ***
Lagged public saving (%GDP) 0.18 0.25  
GDP deflator (%change) 0.08 0.03 ** 0.05 0.02 ** 0.05 0.02 ** 0.03 0.02
GDP per capita growth (%change) 0.03 0.11   0.16 0.09   -0.01 0.04   -0.08 0.05
Change in private credit as % of GDP -0.39 0.26   -0.46 0.15 *** -0.53 0.16 *** -0.07 0.21
Terms of trade (index) 0.17 0.04 *** 0.20 0.04 *** 0.09 0.06
Terms of trade (%change) 0.07 0.11  
Business confidence indicator -0.11 0.04 *
Ex ante real rate -0.03 0.06            
Unemployment rate -0.04 0.32  
R squared 0.85 0.91 0.92 0.86
Number of observations 22 22 22 22
Degrees of freedom 12 14 15 15
Huber-White-Sandwich heteroscedasticity consistent estimator for standard errors
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; * statistically significant at the 10% level.  45 
Finally, we check our results for robustness to changes in definition in our fiscal variable.  
In particular, we replace public saving with the overall balance adjusted for inflation (in 
other words we use the so-called “operational balance”).  In essence this variable equals 
inflation adjusted public saving minus investment.  This measure might in theory be a 
more relevant determinant of private saving.  For example, in the theory of Ricardian 
equivalence, people would expect their future tax burden to be lower not only when 
government saving increases (an increase in taxes or a reduction in government 
consumption), but also when government investment falls, if that investment is not very 
productive.  From the point of view of crowding out and availability of credit to the 
private sector as well, the public S-I balance is likely to be more relevant than 
government saving.     
 
The result of a strong offset between public and private sector saving is robust to this 
change, as we find a similar coefficient and significance level for the new fiscal variable.  
On the other hand, the statistical significance of inflation, the change in credit, and the 
terms of trade disappears completely, so we cannot be sure there really is any effect 
through these variables on private saving.  The correlation matrix (Appendix 3) shows 
that the change in credit is much more highly correlated with the operational balance 
(0.7) than it is with public saving (0.1) (also see Figure 9)—the same is true for the terms 
of trade (-0.6 vs. 0.2)—and this may cause the operational balance to pick up the effect of 
changes in credit and terms of trade.       
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   47 
The conclusion from the above is that there is a large offset between private and public 
sector saving.  We would like to caution, however, against the classical interpretation of 
this result as reflecting Ricardian equivalence.  In that view, to reiterate, the increase in 
public savings (thanks to a strong fiscal adjustment) would have led to a decline in 
private saving because improved public savings today implied a lower future tax burden 
for forward looking, rational agents.  We think this interpretation is far from realistic 
because there is room to suspect that, as in many emerging market economies, the strong 
theoretical assumptions required for the Ricardian equivalence result to hold -- notably 
the absence of liquidity constraints, risk-neutral agents, internal equilibria with bequests 
for everyone, and especially, the certainty that government spending will not increase in 
the future -- are largely absent in the Turkish case as well.   
 
While we could not demonstrate this in our regressions, since public saving does not lose 
its significance when adding our credit variable, a more natural and broader interpretation 
of these findings in our judgment is that government saving is a good proxy measure for 
general economic conditions.  In the recent Turkish stabilization experience, clearly, the 
increase in public savings (or overall fiscal position) through generation of unprecedented 
primary surpluses and an attendant decline in interest payments during this period, 
contributed to restoration of confidence after the 2001 financial crisis.  This, in turn, led 
to lower inflation, lower real interest rates, a greater ability to borrow from abroad, and 
strong FDI inflows (from 2005 onward).  All these factors combined to release resources 
for lending to the private sector, or creating a so-called “crowding in” effect for the 
private sector.  Growth in lending, which is controlled for in the regressions, should in   48 
theory capture this “crowding in”, but is possibly an imperfect measure.   As already 
noted above, for the last few years, it can be argued that it was the global crisis which 
caused both government saving to declined and private saving to rise—causing a 
correlation between the variables, rather than that there was any direct response of private 
saving to public saving.   
 
Finally, measurement error could contribute to the finding of a strong offset coefficient.  
Private and public saving are not derived independently.   Measurement error in public 
saving could cause an offsetting measurement error on private saving.  Similarly, any 
measurement error in the inflation adjustment introduces negative correlation, biasing the 
coefficient on public saving downwards to -1 in the regressions, as also noted in IMF 
(2007). 
33
4.2  Household Survey Data 
  
In this section, we use household budget survey data to explore whether changes in the 
aggregate saving rate were shared among various groups, a method standard in the 
literature (see e.g., Japelli and Pagano, 1997).  This also allows us to examine various 
hypotheses on the drivers of the decline in the saving rate.  We then estimate an equation 
for aggregate household saving, very similar to that of Chamon and Prasad (2008), to 
check, inter alia, for the effect of private health expenditures, social security, and home-
ownership on saving.  The data are from the Household Budget Surveys of 2004-2008 
(see Appendix 1 for details and some caveats on the data). 
                                                 
33 A robustness check using instrumental variables in IMF (2007) did not find that measurement error 
substantially affected the estimates.   49 
Saving across groups 




  The purpose of the table is to illustrate whether any trends in overall saving 
were shared among demographic and socio-economic groups.  The main developments 
we are interested in are the sharp decline in saving from 17 to 10 percent between 2004 
and 2005 and the recent decline in household saving from 12 to 8 percent between 2007 
and 2008.  The latter is somewhat of a mystery given that private sector NIA data point to 
an increase in saving.  The decline between 2004-05 occurred in the context of a rapidly 
growing economy (growth rates around 9%), whereas the decline between 2007-08 
occurred after growth lost some of its momentum, with growth declining to 4.7 and 1 
percent in 2007 and 2008 respectively.   
2004-05 
The sharp decline in saving from 2004 to 2005 turns out to have been shared broadly.  
Saving rates declined roughly by the same amount irrespective of urban-rural location, 
number of  children present in the household, age of the head of household, and 
wealth/income, as proxied by rooms per adult equivalent and education. 
35
                                                 
34 Each sub-group in the table accounts for at least 500 observations. 
  The 
exceptions are that saving rates almost did not decline for workers in the public sector 
35 We cannot condition on income or green card (free health care) because of under-reporting of income, 
which is likely to be worse among green card holders, whose benefits depend on reporting low income. 
Adult equivalents are based on the modified OECD equivalency scale.  This scale takes into account 
economies of scale in household consumption and lower spending on children and the elderly. The 
equivalency scale assigns the first adult a weight of 1, additional persons over 13 years of age a weight of 
0.5, and children under 14 a weight of 0.3.  Thus children under 14, for example, are assumed to consume 
0.3 times as much as the household head.  The lower weights for additional household members reflect 
economies of scale and hence lower costs for additional members.    50 
and that saving declined more for those living in their homes--an indication that a wealth 
effect may be operating since real estate prices were booming in 2005--and less for those 
earning interest income.  Homeowners reduced their saving rate from 19 to 11 percent 
whereas tenants reduced their saving rate much less, from 10 to 7 percent, and the data 
indicate this resulted mainly from higher spending growth.   
Of special interest is the fact that saving declined as much in households headed by 
elderly persons as in other households. This is surprising because the elderly should be 
relatively unaffected by improved economic prospects (retirement income should not be 
affected), an improved fiscal outlook (lower future taxes will affect future generations not 
the elderly themselves
36), or relaxed liquidity constraints (income is not rising over time, 
so such households should not wish to borrow).  We believe this may be related to the 
high rate of ownership among the elderly and a possible wealth effect operating in the 
economy.  Almost 90% of elderly households owned their own home. 
37
The wealth effect deserves some further comment.  A wealth effect from higher housing 
prices will be present if people consume more real estate services now than they will in 
the future.  As noted in the literature survey, and consistent with our results here, this 
may be the fact for the elderly; it holds additionally for owners of lots of land on which 
larger buildings can be built through e.g., partnership with construction companies, as is 
often the case in Turkey.  In those cases, owners will receive a share of the new 
 If the elderly do 
not simply wish to pass on their higher assets as inheritance, they will draw down some 
of their assets after an increase in their value, or at least reduce their saving rate.    
                                                 
36 In theory it is possible that the elderly internalize the impact lower prospective taxes on their children and 
plan to leave fewer bequests (hence reduce their saving), as pointed out by Barro (1974). 
37 66% of households with household head under 40 owned their residence, versus 79% and 88% 
respectively for those with household head of 40-60 and over 60 years old.     51 
construction in proportion to the value of the land, hence may receive more than their 
planned real estate services when prices are high.  There will also be a wealth effect if 
higher housing prices increase access to credit (home equity loans or higher limits for 
personal loans) and affect saving through that channel.   
 
“Living off interest income” is a typical feature of many households in Turkey, the result 
of years of chronic fiscal deficits, macroeconomic instability and high real interest rates, 
hence the emergence of a “rentier class”.  This means that there is a large class of people 
for whom the income effect of lower interest rates—real interest rates fell from almost 
30% in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, to high single digits—was adverse, 
reducing consumption and increasing saving. We attempt to capture these people through 
a dummy variable for people who had interest income and found that such households did 
not reduce their saving, as they moderated their spending growth.
38
  
  The policy 
implication of finding a large income effect (which outweighs the substitution effect) for 
households with interest income, is that measures such as reducing taxation of interest 
may not achieve their goal of raising private saving, while having a budgetary cost.  
The failure of saving among employees in the public sector to decline substantially
  39
                                                 
38 Interest income was defined as the sum of bank interest income (local and foreign currency deposits) and 
interest income on government and bank bills.  15 percent of households had such income in 2005. 
Households with interest income experienced income increases of 12% and spending increases of 12%; in 
contrast, households without interest income experienced income increases of 13% and spending increases 
of 24%. 
 
reflect higher income growth, not lower spending growth relative to private sector 
39 Public sector is defined as civil service plus public enterprises.  However, in the sample, there seem to be 
very few public enterprise workers, based on answers to the questionnaire.   52 
workers. Possibly the large income increase may have been seen as transitory, thereby 
limiting consumption out of this higher income.   
 
2007-08 
Table 2 indicates that the decline in saving rate between 2007 and 2008 was shared 
among all groups (the only exception is extended families).  Younger households, tenant 
households, and households where the household head had middle and high school 
education experienced especially large declines.  The unemployed and those with tertiary 
education experienced smaller declines in saving.  The slowdown in real estate values did 
not happen till September 2008 (time of the Lehman debacle), so it is unlikely that 
tenants felt substantially better off, which would have explained a large decline in their 
saving.   More generally, the decline in saving is mysterious, because in the past Turkey 
always seemed to respond to economic crises by raising saving (and the NIA data, unlike 
the household survey data, do point in that direction).   
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
overall 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.08
rural 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.08
urban 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.08
<40 years old 0.17 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.03
40-60 years old 0.16 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.10
>60 years old 0.19 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.10
zero kids (and head of household under 60) 1/ 0.22   0.08 0.12 0.16 0.05
1 kid (nuclear family) 0.18 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.10
2 kids (nuclear family) 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.05
3 or more kids (nuclear family) 0.12   0.05 0.07 0.09 0.06
extended families 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.12
other (single and zero kids with head of household over 60) 0.16 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.06
have interest income 0.13 0.13 0.14   0.20 0.17
no interest income 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.07
owns residence 0.19 0.11 0.11 0.13   0.12
doesn't own residence 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.10 -0.03
public  0.13 0.12 0.11   0.16   0.10
private 0.21 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.09
N/A 0.09   0.04   0.03   0.06   0.05
self-employed and employers 0.40 0.20 0.22   0.24   0.18
not self-employed 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.03
NA 3/ 0.09 0.04 0.04   0.06   0.05
green card -0.15 -0.19 -0.10   -0.06   -0.08
no green card 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.09
enterprise< 10 employees 0.22 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.08
enterprise>=10 employees 0.16 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.08
NA 3/ 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05
lowest 20% household income -0.25 -0.36 -0.27 -0.24 -0.36
highest 80% household income 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.10
lowest 90% household income 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.01
highest 10% household income 0.35 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.28
primary education or less 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.05
middle and high school education 0.16 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.07
higher education 0.22 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.16
employed 0.19 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.09
unemployed 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05
lowest 20% rooms/adult equivalent 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.04
highest 80% rooms/adult equivalent 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.09
no hot water 0.12 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.00
hot water 0.18 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.09
doubtful 4/ -0.71 -0.82   -0.57 -0.52 -0.59
not doubtful 0.18 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.10
  memo: percent doubtful observations 6                      8         8            8            10          
1/ There is a break in the data in 2008.  Previously data refered to nuclear households only; in 2008 data refers to all households without kids.
2/ Categories do not sum to total, because single people and households without kids but with household head over 60 not included.
3/ Corresponds to roughly 30% of the cases.
4/ 
                     Table 4.  Group Household Savings Rates, Characteristics of Household Head
Doubtful cases are those where household income was in lowest quartile, yet had hot water;  
those with negative income or spending and cases of extra-large dissavings, where 
dissavings is larger than 2.6 times annual income. Six-11 percent of observations were 
classified as doubtful depending on the year, with a clear upward trend.  54 
Saving equation 
 
We next estimate a comprehensive equation for the household saving ratio 
(saving/disposable income) following Chamon and Prasad’s (2008) work on China.  This 
equation controls for demographics of the household, household income, education, 
insurance and employment characteristics, large expected health expenditures,
  40
 
  home 
ownership, and interest income.  Five different categories of insurance are distinguished:  
(1) participation the general social security scheme (SSK).  This is the omitted category 
in the regressions; (2) participation in the scheme for civil servants (Emekli Sandigi); (3) 
participation in the scheme for the self-employed (Bag-Kur); (4) other; and (5) no social 
security.   
The equation includes the log of household income, and is estimated with instrumental 
variables given the measurement error in this variable. 
41
                                                 
40 Expected health expenditures are obtained from a separate probit equation, which follows Chamon and 
Prasad (2008).  The dependent variable equals one when health expenditures exceed 10 percent of 
consumption expenditures. Independent variables are the log of non-health expenditures, a dummy variable 
for urban/rural location, a dummy variable indicating the presence of health insurance, and 4 variables 
indicating the number of persons under 15, 15 to 39, 40 to 59, and over 60.  The regression is estimated for 
pooled 2004-05 data and for 2006, 2007, and 2008 separately, with year dummies interacted with 
demographic variables.  “Absence of any health insurance” has a positive coefficient in this equation, the 
number of household members under 15 has a negative coefficient, and the number of household members 
over 60 has a positive coefficient.  An indicator variable is then constructed based on this probit, which 
equals one when the probability of large health expenditures exceeds 10 percent.  This indicator variable is 
then entered in the household saving regression.   
  It is estimated for a core group 
of households, which excludes households whose head was under 25, over 70, a student, 
41 In Chamon and Prasad (2008) no such instrumentation is done, but this is critical here given under-
reporting of incomes (see Appendix II).    55 
involuntarily unemployed, disabled or sick, waiting for work or in seasonal employment. 




Using IV is critical in our case since measurement error on income causes spurious 
correlation between S/Y and Y.  When Y is low because of under-reporting, (Y-C)/Y will 
automatically be low even if there is no behavioral relationship between Y and S/Y.  As 
instruments we use all independent variables (other than income) plus, in order to capture 
income, a dummy variable for whether the household has hot water and the number of 
rooms per capita (specifically, the number of rooms divided by the number of adult 
equivalents, using the modified OECD scale described in Section 4).  The three classic 
conditions for a valid instrument to solve the problem of measurement error seem to be 
satisfied.  These conditions for the instruments are (1) low correlation with measurement 
error; (2) high correlation with income; and (3) instruments do not belong in the 
regression in their own right.  If the instruments were to be correlated with measurement 
error, say because the true value of income is correlated with measurement error (e.g. the 
truly poor underreport more), we would continue to have spurious correlation between 
S/Y and instrumented income (e.g. when true income is low, under-reporting is more and 
S/Y is lower).  To check whether this is the case, we construct a proxy for measurement 
error (a dummy variable which is one when saving ratios are below -1, that is dissaving 
equal to 100 percent of income) and check the correlation with our instruments.  In the 
                                                 
42 This follows the literature (see e.g., Japelli and Pagano, 1997, Chamon and Prasad, 2008).  Households 
with young or older heads are typically wealthier than average, and including them would thus cause 
selectivity bias.   
43 Given the very large number of cases of large negative saving rates, we had cause to believe there was 
large under-reporting (Appendix 1).  We thought this problem would be larger for cases where the head of 
household did not report social security status, where incomes were in the lowest quintile yet the household 
had access to hot water, where income or spending were negative (theoretically impossible), and where dis-
saving were larger than 260% of income, and restricted the sample by excluding these observations.   56 
entire sample the correlation is close to zero, though in the restricted sample the 
correlation is somewhat high at -.11 for our instrument “access to hot water” (“sicaksu”).  
Other instruments included by virtue of the 2SLS procedure are all close to zero in 
correlation with measurement error proxied by “low saving”.   The instruments are also 
reasonably highly correlated with income—around 50% and 20% correlation for the hot 
water dummy and number of rooms per capita (“roomsperoecd”) respectively (Appendix 
3). 
 
Table 4 shows the results for the household saving equation for each year from 2004 to 
2008.  The findings are remarkable constant across years.  
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    Coef. t     Coef. t     Coef. t     Coef. t     Coef. t
Log income 0.144 *** 4.7 0.224 *** 7.1 0.197 *** 6.5 0.207 *** 6.6 0.191 *** 5.2
Urban location -0.024 -1.5 -0.025 -1.2 -0.017 -1.0 -0.067 *** -3.5 -0.053 *** -2.7
Social security scheme
  Emekli Sandigi (civil servants) 0.040 1.4 0.067 ** 2.0 0.019 0.5 0.018 0.6 0.074 ** 2.3
  Bag-Kur (self-employed) 0.142 *** 6.7 0.063 *** 2.6 0.126 *** 6.0 0.075 *** 3.5 0.040 1.6
  Other 0.089 1.3 0.143 0.9 -0.149 -1.1 0.082 * 1.8 0.150 *** 3.3
  No social security -0.003 -0.2 -0.012 -0.6 0.028   1.5 0.022 1.3 -0.002 -0.1
Private sector -0.011 -0.5 0.018 0.7 -0.009 -0.3 -0.049 ** -2.0 -0.006 -0.2
Have interest income -0.030 -1.4 0.010 0.5 0.012 0.6 0.007 0.4 0.001 0.0
Health risk 0.272 *** 6.1 0.272 *** 4.8 0.230 *** 2.9 0.247 *** 3.8 0.257 *** 2.6
Homeowner 0.027 * 1.9 0.001 0.1 0.011 0.7 -0.004 -0.3 0.089 *** 5.3
Head aged 40-60 0.003 0.2 0.010 0.6 -0.019 -1.1 -0.001 0.0 -0.004 -0.2
Head aged over 60 0.015 0.4 -0.138 -1.6 -0.055 -1.0 -0.087 * -1.7 -0.026 -0.6
Log household size -0.052 ** -2.2 -0.070 ** -2.2 -0.014 -0.4 -0.110 *** -4.0 -0.103 *** -3.1
Share members aged 0-4 -0.054 -0.9 0.115 1.5 0.003 0.0 0.049 0.7 -0.040 -0.5
Share members aged 5-14 -0.108 ** -2.1 0.055 1.0 -0.070 -1.2 0.117 ** 2.1 0.049 0.7
Share members aged 15-19 -0.112 ** -2.1 -0.057 -0.8 -0.169 ** -2.6 0.022 0.4 -0.107 -1.5
Share members aged 60+ 0.070 1.1 0.051 0.4 0.104 1.1 0.196 *** 2.9 0.034   0.3
Share members that are housewife 0.063 1.6 -0.024 -0.5 -0.109 ** -2.2 -0.038 -0.9 -0.108 ** -2.2
Secondary education, head 0.008 0.5 -0.049 *** -2.8 -0.011 -0.7 -0.022   -1.4 -0.003 -0.2
Tertiary education, head -0.030 -1.0 -0.118 *** -3.5 -0.057 * -1.7 -0.075 ** -2.5 -0.024 -0.7
Secondary education, spouse 0.003 0.2 -0.030 -1.4 -0.005 -0.3 -0.004 -0.2 -0.042 ** -2.2
Tertiary education, spouse 0.008 0.2 -0.109 ** -2.4 -0.043 -1.2 0.011 0.4 -0.059 -1.7
Extended family -0.008 -0.4 0.015 0.6 -0.015 -0.6 0.011 0.5 0.056 ** 2.1
Constant -1.189 *** -4.4 -1.993 *** -7.2 -1.780 *** -6.4 -1.742 *** -6.0 -1.745 *** -5.1
Number of observations:  5134 5107 5330 5132 4948
R-squared 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.17
Omitted categories:  head of household 25-29, social security=SSK scheme (general scheme); spouse education primary or less, or no spouse in household.
***statistically significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
2007 2008
Table 5:  Survey Instrumental Variables Regression:  Savings/Disposable Income
2006
Estimated with instrumental variables.  Instruments for log income include all variables in the regression plus access to hot water and number of rooms per adult equivalent. 
Sample consists of a core group of households, which excludes households whose head was under 25, over 70 [65 for surveys starting in 2006], a student, involuntarily 
unemployed, disabled or sick, waiting for work or in seasonal employment.  Sample excludes doubtful cases.  Doubtful cases are those where household income was in lowest 
quartile, yet had hot water; those where social security status of household head was not reported;  those with negative income or spending and cases of extra-large 
dissavings, where dissavings is larger than 2.6 times annual income Health risk is a dummy variable equal to 1 for households where a probit regression indicates a 10% or 
greater chance of health expenditures in excess of 10% of consumption expenditures. 
2005 2004  58 
Income is statistically significant with positive coefficients for both years, indicating that 
the average propensity to save is higher for the rich than the poor, consistent with 
empirical evidence and both the original Keynesian formulation and more recent theories 
(see Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes, 2000).  The coefficients are of a reasonable order of 
magnitude.  For example, a one percent increase in income is associated with an increase 




There is some evidence for a positive impact of uncertainty on saving in line with 
theory.  Health spending risk has a positive, large and statistically significant impact on 
saving.  Participation in the social security scheme for the self-employed, who are 
presumably subject to greater uncertainty than employees, has a positive statistically 
significant coefficient.   This result could also reflect enterprise saving, since the self-
employed include small business owners.   
 
We also find some evidence that homeownership was associated with higher saving 
(compared to tenants) in 2004 and not in 2005, consistent with a relative wealth effect 
which would have driven down saving for homeowners relative to tenants (as home 
prices increased substantially in this period 
45
                                                 
44 Note that the coefficients cannot be interpreted as reflecting the link between permanent income and the 
saving ratio.  Following the original Friedman (1957) argument, there would be a positive relationship 
between income and the saving ratio even in the absence of any link between permanent income and the 
saving ratio.  This is because under the PIH, temporary income shocks are reflected in saving so that 
temporarily richer households save more, which leads to a positive relationship between income and saving 
ratios.   This suggests some caution in suggesting that as incomes increase in Turkey, saving ratios will 
increase; or in suggesting that richer people save more.   
).  These results fit our earlier finding that 
the saving rate for homeowners as a group declined much more than that of others 
45The increase in house prices (and also stock prices) is a feature of the post-2001 crisis experience, and is 
related to the sharp decline in interest rates and increased availability of credit.   
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between 2004-05 (Table 2).   Some care is necessary in interpreting these findings.  As 
noted in the literature survey, it is difficult to justify the existence of a wealth effect for 
homeowners on theoretical grounds:  after all, home-owners will normally continue to 
live in their homes, so are not directly better off simply because these homes are worth 
more.  In fact, home-owners face two offsetting effects:  an increase in value of an asset, 
and an increase in imputed housing costs.   Nevertheless, psychological factors (or money 
illusion) might have been at play, boosting spending among homeowners.  In addition, 
home-owners might have experienced an increase in access to liquidity as owners of 
collateral which had gone up in value. Tenants were worse off as the result of the housing 
boom and attendant increase in rents, and would naturally have been more reluctant to 
borrow or reduce saving.   Our finding that home-owners reduced saving relatively more 
than tenants in 2005 stands in contrast with that a finding for the UK, referred to in the 
literature survey, where home-owner and tenants reduced their saving by similar amounts 
(Attanasio and others, 2009).  The latter finding has been adduced as evidence against a 
wealth effect in the UK, and in favor of interpreting the link between consumption as 
housing wealth as reflecting general economic prospects (Calomiris, Longhofer, and 
Miles, 2009).  Our finding here suggests that in Turkey there truly may be a wealth 
effect, possibly because of the special factors referred to above (the possibility of 
building larger buildings in partnership with construction companies), because of money 
illusion, greater access to credit, or because the elderly do not wish to pass on the entire 
increase in their home’s value to their descendants.   
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Between 2007-08 a reversal seems to occur, whereby homeowners tend to increase their 
saving relative to tenants.  This is consistent with our earlier finding that the saving rate 
for homeowners did not decline as much as for others during 2007-08.  Home prices and 
rents declined in 2008 (though only toward the end of the year), and this would have 
caused homeowners to increase their saving relatively to tenants (e.g., because they found 
their credit restricted, and hence needed more buffer saving).  Why the saving rate of 
tenants, and indeed economy-wide, would have fallen in absolute terms is however not 
clear.  
 
The dummy for households with interest income is insignificant, somewhat surprising 
given our earlier findings that such households did not reduce their saving rate in 2005 
whereas others did. 
 
Age of household head has no effect (other than in 2007), which is not surprising, given 
that the regressions control for other factors (income, household size, number of children 
of various ages) that underlie the relationship between age of household head and saving 
ratio.   
 
Household size, which captures the effect of the number of children, has a significant 
negative impact on saving, as does the share of household members 10-14 and 15-19 
(some years only), consistent with findings in the literature that a high dependency ratio 
depresses saving.   
   61 
Tertiary education for the head of household has a significant negative effect on the 
saving ratio (2005-07 only).  Possibly this reflects greater access to credit for those layers 
of the population.  The share of household members who are housewives and the dummy 
for extended families are for the most part statistically insignificant.   
 
5.  Projecting Turkish Saving:  the role of demographics, credit, and social security  
 
In this section we pay special attention to three determinants of saving which are likely to 
change in the future:  (1) demographics, as the demographic transition proceeds (a 
reduction in the youth dependency ratio and increase in the old-age dependency ratio; (2) 
credit to the private sector, as financial deepening proceeds; and (3) social security, 
where substantive reforms were carried out in 2008.  In the first two areas, we obtain a 
quantitative estimate what could happen to the private Turkish saving rate in future based 
on econometric estimates of importance of these factors.  For social security reform, we 




Population projections for Turkey based on recent censuses 
46
                                                 
46 Since 2006, Turkey uses address-based censuses, which has resulted in a downward projection of the 
population by 5 million people.    
 indicate that the largest 
population groups are the 6 5-year cohorts spanning the ages of 0 to 29.  Each of these 5-
year cohorts contains about 6.4 million people (men and women combined), in 2010.  As 
a result, the population pyramid contains large vertical sections at the base (Figure 10). 
The youth dependency ratio—the ratio of 0-14 to 15-64 year olds—is a still sizeable 39   62 
percent.    Over time, as these large segments age, in conjunction with lower fertility,  the 
youth dependency ratio is projected to decline to 32 percent by 2025.  The old-age 
dependency ratio—the ratio of 65+ to 15-64 year olds—is projected to increase from 10 
to 14 percent, reflecting lower mortality.   
 
The decline in youth dependency ratio is expected to lead to an increase in saving, 
because spending on children will decline as there are fewer of them.  This increase in 
saving will of course be tempered to the extent that parents substitute quality for quantity 
of children and increase education expenditures (which are classified as consumption, 
though they are really investment in human capital).  On the other hand, fewer children 
go hand in hand with the breakdown of the family support system, and parents will need 
greater retirement saving.  In addition, there is the impact of greater longevity, which 
leads to a need for more saving to cover longer retirement, and of youth unemployment, 
which will probably fall as the number of youths falls over time.  Overall, therefore, 
saving is likely to increase as the result of a lower youth dependency ratio.  On the other 
hand, aging of the population may lead to a decline in saving, since older people, while 
still having positive saving in Turkey (as in many other countries), tend to save less than 
working age people.   
 
What quantitative impact will the change in demographic structure have on saving?  One 
quick way to gauge this is to use existing estimates based on panel data studies.  Loayza 
et. al. (2000b) estimates for LDCs using a GMM system estimator that a 1 percentage 
point reduction in youth dependency ratio is associated with a 0.3 percentage point   63 
increase in the saving rate (as a share of private disposable income) in the short-run and a 
0.5 percentage point increase in the long-run. 
47  Multiplying by the projected decline in 
the youth dependency ratio from 39 to 32 percent, we might then expect an increase in 
private saving ratio of some 3.5 percentage points in the long-run.  For the old-age 
dependency ratio, a 1 percentage point increase in the old-age dependency ratio is 
associated with a decline of 1.4 percentage points in the saving rate in the short-run and 
of 2.6 percentage points in the long-run.  Based on these estimates, the projected increase 
in the old-age dependency ratio of some 4 percentage points should be associated with a 
decline in the saving rate of 10.4 percentage points in the long-run.  Overall these 
estimates suggest the saving rate will decline by 7 percentage points as a result of the 
combined changes in youth and old-age dependency ratios.  There is of course 
uncertainty surrounding these estimates, but at any rate, demographics do not provide 




For OECD countries, the magnitudes of the coefficient on both the youth and old-age 
dependency ratios are much lower, implying only a 1 percentage point decline in the 
saving rate in the long-run (Appendix 5), and the decline in saving would be less.      
Figure 10.  Turkey Population Pyramids, 2010 and 2025 
                                                 
47 Their Column 3 results, reproduced as Table 5 in Appendix 5.   
48 In our earlier paper, we had found a much larger decline in the youth dependency ratio, based on older 
projections by the US Census, which in turn assumed a much faster decline in fertility than more recent 
projections do.     64 
 
 
Other, more sophisticated methods can be used to estimate the effect of demographics on 
future saving.  For example, Dynan, Edelberg and Palumbo (2008) for the US and  
Attanasio and  Székely for various Latin American and South East Asian countries, 
project saving forward after deriving the age-savings profile by age of household head, 
taking into account cohort effect.  For new cohorts of households they assume that the 
age-saving profile will be the same as the youngest observed cohort.  For the future age 
distribution of household heads, they simply use the projected age distribution of the 
population, a rather strong assumption.  Van Rijckeghem and Ucer (2009) obtain 
estimates of future saving after deriving the individual age saving profile from the profile 
of saving by age of household head (see Figures 18-20), and match this profile to the 
projected age distribution of the population.  By working at the individual level, they 
avoid having to assume that the age distribution of household heads equals that of the   65 
population.  A caveat to their analysis is however that it presumes “cohort effects” are 
negligeable, since the data is not available to estimate these cohort effects. 
49
 
   




 confirms that a decline in the relative number of dependents should 
lead to an increase in saving and an increase in the relative number of elderly should lead 
to a decline in saving, at least if these age profiles reflect true age effects rather than 
cohort effects.  
 
                                                 
49 Cohort effects refer to factors affecting an entire cohort, such as a frugal attitude resulting from war-time 
experiences, attitudes towards leaving bequests, or differential social security entitlements.  Year effects 
reflect macro-shocks or measurement error specific to that year.  It has been long recognized that it is not 
possible to separately identify the effects of age, year (time), and cohort (birthyear) in panel data, since the 
variables are a linear combination of each-other (time=birthyear+age).  Restrictions need to be made on the 
data and these may be arbitrary.  The literature has often followed Deaton (1997) in restricting average year 
effects equal to zero and making year effects orthogonal to a trend.  An alternative approach recognizes that 
the change in the slope of the cohort, age and time effects can be estimated without restriction, by second 
differencing the data with respect to two of the three effects (McKenzie, 2006).  Imposing one restriction 
on the slope and two restrictions on the level is then sufficient to recover slope and level of the effects.   
Another approach is to restrict age, time, and/or cohort effects to follow a higher-order polynomial.  Japelli, 
1999, for example uses a 5
th degree polynomial.  These methods can unfortunately not be used in Turkey 
because of the relative few surveys combined with the fact that since 2006 the data no longer identify age, 
but only 5-year age groups.  Since this means surveys have to be 5 year apart to follow a 5-year cohort 
through time,  we have in effect only 2 useable surveys for the moment (2003 and 2008).   Even though we 
assume cohort effects are zero, hence leaving our results open to the criticism that they may reflect cohort 
effects, our findings for the age-saving profile are in correspondence with what one would expect for life-
cycle saving.  It is hard to imagine how cohort effects would cause this pattern.  Very recent cohorts and 
older cohorts would have to save little; and middle cohorts would have to save a lot.   
50 The first method involves obtaining the contribution of persons of each age-group to household saving by 
regressing household saving on the number of persons of each age-group in the household.  The second 
method uses the OECD equivalency ratios to derive consumption for each person of a certain age from 
household income.  See Van Rijckeghem and Ucer (2009).  The age-saving profiles do show very high 
saving for persons 75 years of age or older.  This however likely reflects a selection bias, whereby richer 
persons (who likely also save a lot) also tend to live longer.     66 
   67 






LSS estimates that for LDCs, a 1 percentage point increase in credit flow/GDP is 
associated with a 0.5 percentage point decline in the private saving/GDP ratio in the 
short-run. 
51
                                                 
51 Note that under this specification, it is not credit/GDP but the credit flow, divided by GDP.  This is not 
the best measure of credit conditions, since owing to inflation, it is possible to have a positive credit flow, 
without having any increase in real credit or in credit/GDP.    
 Turkey’s private sector credit to GDP ratio is currently a very low 25%.  We 
will study the effect of an increase in private credit to levels in Eastern Europe—of 
around 50% of GDP—spread over 10 years.  Assuming nominal GDP growth of 12% a   69 
year (7% inflation and 4.5% real growth), we find that the necessary credit flow is some 
7% of GDP during 2010-2019, up from 4% in 2009.  This would, based on LSS 
estimates, be associated with a decline of 1.5 percentage points ((7-4)x0.5) in the short 
run (double in the long-run).  The estimate for LDCs is on the high side—for OECD 
countries, the estimate is only 1/6
th this size, and would imply a reduction of saving/GDP 




Our own estimates from our “key specification” suggest a role for the change in the 
credit/GDP ratio rather than its level.  For saving to decline requires an increased rate of 
change in credit/GDP.  Starting from a stable level of credit/GDP, a 1 percentage point 
increase in credit/GDP ratio is associated with a 0.5 percentage point decline in the 
saving ratio in the short-run.  In the long-run, the effect is 0.4 percentage points, if credit 
continues to increase by 1 percentage points a year.  If credit/GDP stabilizes at a higher 
level, the long-run effect of the increase in credit is zero.   From this point of view, an 
increase in credit poses no long-run problems.  It is of course possible that the effect of 
credit is also captured through government saving, in which case there would be long-run 
effects not captured here.       
 
Social security reform  
 
                                                 
52 We follow Hevia (2010) in taking this approach.  However, Hevia considers a reduction (where we 
consider an increase) in flow/GDP by comparing the historical value of credit flow for 1980-2008 with a 
hypothetical lower value for credit flow.  In our view, the historical values (which are very high) are miss-
leading since they are driven by high inflation.   70 
The social security reform of early 2008 comprised the following:  (a) the retirement age 
remains unchanged until 2035 (currently 60 for male and 58 for female), and then is 
raised by one year, every other year, to reach 65 for both sexes in 2048.   This means that 
men born in 1975 will have to retire in 2036 instead of 2035, i.e. work one year more, 
and have a one-year shorter retirement.  Men born in 1980 and after (those 30 years old 




  Women born in 1977 will have to retire in 2036 instead of 2035.  Women 
born in 1982 and after will have to work 7 years more and spend up to 7 years less in 
retirement. Because time in retirement is likely to go down, plus years with opportunity 
to save (working years) would increase, retirement saving would likely fall.  This type of 
measure is therefore beneficial for the social security deficit, but may lead to lower 
private saving.  (It is quite likely of course that given progressively greater longevity, the 
need for retirement saving is increasing in the background).  Currently about 1/3 of the 
working age population is affected (those currently under 30 years old), but over time the 
entire working population will be.   
b) the number of premium days is raised to 9,000 days from 7,000 at SSK—the general 
insurance scheme (it is already 9,000 days at Bag-Kur, the scheme for self-employed and 
Emekli Sandigi, the scheme for civil servants) by increasing it 100 days every year from 
2007 onward, thereby reaching 9,000 in 20 years.  Premium days are a second criterion, 
in addition to the minimum retirement age.  Only those who would otherwise have met 
the retirement age but now need to delay retirement according to the higher premium 
                                                 
53 If working longer is good for longevity, time spent in retirement may not be reduced by this much.   71 
days requirement will be affected.  As for the first measure, there will be less time in 
retirement and more working years and a likely reduction in retirement saving.     
 
(c) the income replacement rate for retirement pensions is slightly reduced to 2.5 percent 
for every 360 days of total 'premium paid days', from levels around 2.6%-3% depending 
on the social security scheme.  It is then reduced further to 2% from 2016 onward.  Such 
reductions in replacement ratio should stimulate private saving as individuals now need 
to provide for their own retirement to a greater extent than before.   The measures, 
however, have an impact only over the medium-term since grandfather clauses protecting 
existing rights specify that accrued pension benefits cannot be reduced, so that the 
replacement rate will take time to fall.   
 
d) In determining the pensionable base, wages are valorized according to a (50-50) 
weighted average of inflation and wage growth, and all future pensions are indexed to 
inflation. Compared to past practice, both measures serve to reduce pensions and should 
stimulate private saving.  
 
6.  Policy Options 
 
When thinking about policy options, one possibility is to take the agnostic line:  that the 
role of savings in resolving Turkey’s main macro challenges is somewhat overstated.  If 
Turkey were to figure out the true bottlenecks to growth, say, through a well-thought out 
process of “growth diagnostics”, a solid saving ratio could simply follow.  In other words,   72 
this line of thinking would probably advise putting the emphasis on obstacles to growth 
rather than on raising the saving rate per se (see Chapter 2 in Rodrik, 2007).  In this 
context, one needs to look for measures that can raise growth, without a need to raise 
investment (i.e. reforms which increase total factor productivity), so as to ensure a 
reduction in the current account deficit.  One assumption underlying this line of thinking 
is that growth will raise saving, as panel-data regressions seem to indicate is the case—
but this is not guaranteed to be the case for Turkey.  In fact, recent interpretations 
(discussed in the introduction) of the positive correlation between growth and saving 
argue that this link follows from distortions to the saving decision (such as financial 
frictions which prevent consumption smoothing; Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2009).  Such 
distortions do not seem to be present in the Turkish case, and in fact Turkish growth and 
saving in the past always went in opposite directions.      
 
An alternative tack is to address external imbalance—the vulnerability which results 
when domestic saving are inadequate to finance investment –  through the generic 
expenditure-switching and expenditure-reducing policies, i.e. through lower 
absorption/growth (consumption plus investment) and a weaker currency.  These could 
be engineered through a tighter fiscal and looser monetary policy mix.  However, this 
would not come without complications, given Turkey’s -- in our view its entirely sensible 
--  commitment to an Inflation Targeting framework (a combination of a floating 
exchange rate regime with emphasis on price stability as the overriding objective).   
   73 
Another complication is the large offset of private saving to increases in public saving.  
This would call for tighter monetary policy or prudential regulations (“sand in the 
wheels”), to control credit growth, rather than looser monetary policy.  Tighter monetary 
policy would tend to lead to appreciation of the exchange rate, and exports would fall 
victim to this strategy.  A more promising alternative might be macro-prudential 
regulations to stem a credit boom.  Jeanne (2008) has proposed a tax on debt.  The 
economic justification for this is an externality:  individual borrowers impose a negative 
externality on others because their borrowing increases systemic risk by contributing both to 
a higher current account deficit and the probability of a credit crisis.   
 
A less benign global environment may do the job of reducing vulnerabilities, too, as 
witnessed during 2008-09, by reducing capital inflows and hence investment, but the 
casualty would again be low growth.  The good news is that Turkey has shown resilience 
in the global crisis, and managed capital outflows without a currency or financial crisis, 
or large corporate bankruptcies.   
 
Another line of thinking is to insist on policy activism explicitly targeted at increasing the 
saving rate.  The bad news is that, the ability of policy to affect the private saving rate 
seems somewhat limited in Turkey, the main reason being that there do not seem to be 
large distortions favoring consumption over saving.   
 
What are the standard micro-economic options to encourage private saving?  A standard 
option is to encourage a shift from income taxes to consumption (indirect) taxes, which 
would stimulate saving since it would no longer be taxed.  However, in Turkey,   74 
consumption taxes already make up two-thirds of tax revenue, in contrast to international 
practice, notably in OECD countries.   
 
Liberalization of the financial sector and the development of institutions that facilitate 
long-term saving are another tool for increasing saving.  Laws and practices in this area 
do not seem to be an impediment for long-term saving in Turkey, however.  
Liberalization of deposit rates occurred in the early 1980s in Turkey.  The institutional 
framework for long-term saving—insurance, mutual funds, and private pension funds— 
is also fully in place. 
54   Portfolio allocation rules are not restrictive, unlike in some 
countries where the majority of funds under management by insurance companies and 
pension funds are required to be invested in government bonds.  As a result, returns on 
these instruments are competitive, and are thus not an impediment to long-term saving. 
55  
Nevertheless the number of participants in insurance, mutual funds and pension funds is 
quite limited.  The number of life-insurance policies is small, amounts under management 
by mutual funds are some 3 percent of GDP, and there are only about 1.5 million 
contributors to private pension plans, with contributions of only $3.3 billion as of 
December 2007, or some 0.5% of GDP.  
56
                                                 
54  The basic  laws are the new 2007 Turkish Insurance Law, prepared in accordance with EU norms 
(replacing the 1959 Insurance Supervision Act and its various amendments), the 2007 Revision of the 
Mutual Funds Law (various laws dated 1993 through 2006), and the 2001 Law on Private Pensions Savings 
and Investments.  The legal and institutional framework for private pensions was completed in 2002.    
  Still, participation is not out of line with 
other emerging markets with voluntary pension schemes, especially given the fact that 
pension funds only started operating in October 2003.   
55 See, for instance, Mulheisen (1997) for a discussion of the case of India.   
56 Group policies are very limited, constituting only 10% of total policies (the remainder being individual 
policies).  Rules for vesting (portability of pension rights when shifting employers) were initially unclear, 
reducing demand for group pensions, but these issues were largely resolved in 2006.   75 
Interest taxation could be reduced; this could through a substitution effect lead to higher 
private saving.
57
Another standard prescription is social security reform. As discussed above, replacement 
rates have already been reduced in Turkey and the social security deficit itself is no 
longer a concern.  An option to raise private saving is to use public funded pension 
programs (where investors receive the returns on their saving), rather than PAYG 
programs.  The latter tend to depress private saving as private consumption is higher to 
the extent people expect pension benefits to exceed their pension contributions.  A switch 
to a fully funded system is certainly no panacea for Turkey, notably because in the 
transition to such a system, the government continues to be liable for existing pension 
liabilities, without having corresponding revenues.  
 Or US-style Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), which allow IRA 
contributions to be deducted from taxable income (with retirement income taxed in 
exchange, but at a lower tax-rate), could be introduced. However, these measures would 
be risky as they would also reduce government revenues.  The overall impact on national 
saving would depend on how elastic private savings are to the measures.  The World 
Bank Saving Project concludes that, “tax incentives have only small effects on national 
saving, particularly when the negative effects on public saving are taken into account.” 
Our own finding that there is likely a substantial income effect on interest earners, which 
would go in the direction of higher consumption and lower saving, also suggests tax 
incentives may have a limited impact, though more research is necessary to verify this 
result.   
                                                 
57 The income effect would make interest-earners better off, which would lead to a further boost in 
consumption, so the overall effect is not clear.   Also, in response to lower taxation, interest rates might fall, 




In  this paper, we found that Turkish overall and private saving rates have not been 
chronically low in the sense that, excluding Asia and oil-exporting countries, both have 
been about equal to emerging market averages.  However, there is a chronic problem in 
another sense:  the overall saving rate -- in particular private saving rate – tends to fall 
sharply during each boom period, as we’ve observed in this paper.  Having experienced a 
recent boom from the aftermath of the 2001 financial crisis, this explains why Turkish 
saving is currently low by international and its own historical standards.  
 
Motivated by this observation, we proceeded to ask why saving fell dramatically during 
the last boom episode, by examining the “usual suspects”, suggested by the theoretical 
and empirical literature. These usual suspects include improved prospects, higher access 
to credit, lower interest rates, the wealth effect, and Ricardian effects from higher public 
saving.  We used macroeconomic data, confidence data and household survey data to 
shed light on the issue.   
 
Our time-series results point to the role of ample liquidity, itself the by-product of a 
successful fiscal-led stabilization program and a benign international environment, and a 
possible independent role for increased government saving.   
 
We also found evidence of an effect of home-ownership: home-owners reduced their 
saving rate substantially, whereas the reduction was only minor for tenants.  This result   77 
makes sense, given that tenants were relatively worse off as the result of the boom in 
house prices and rents, and also helps explain another finding in the paper, namely the 
large decline in savings among households headed by the elderly.  Finally, we find that 
households with interest income did not reduce their saving, consistent with a relatively 
large income effect from reduced interest rates.  The policy implication of this finding is 
that measures to stimulate saving by increasing its rate of return (such as reduced interest 
taxation), may not have much of an impact. 
 
While private saving increased as the result of the financial crisis of 2008, as liquidity 
dried up and economic prospects deteriorated, we can expect saving to fall again to 2007 
levels in the next upturn when credit growth resumes.  Demographics are more likely to 
lead to a decline in private saving than not, and the same is true for the impact of recently 
implemented social security reforms.  Hence policy measures to increase the total saving 
rate by a few percentage points will be required to contain the current account deficit 
within the safe zone of 2-3% of GDP.  This could be accomplished through tighter fiscal 
policy, which would however need to be accompanied by tight monetary policy and/or 
prudential mechanisms targeted at curbing extensive credit growth.  This would be 
necessary to prevent spillovers from higher public saving into lower interest rates and 
higher credit, and thus to avoid a large decline of private saving in response to public 
saving.   
 
The ability of policy to affect the private saving rate, as opposed to the public saving rate, 
seems somewhat limited in Turkey, the main reason being that there do not seem to be   78 
large distortions favoring consumption over saving.  Measures which could be tried, such 
as reduction of interest taxation and IRA-type policies to encourage retirement saving are 
not certain to raise private saving, given that they also have an income effect which tends 
to reduce saving, while having a budgetary cost.   
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Appendix 1.  Household Budget Survey Data 
 
The household surveys of 2004-08 used in this study cover about 8000 households each, 
and over 30,000 individuals. They provide extensive data on household income, 
expenditures, and assets.  Incomes are in theory comprehensively measured as they 
include the imputed rent on owner-occupied housing as well as the value of in-kind 
payments by employers and of own production.  Separate questions aim to identify, both 
cash and in-kind, wage income, presents, bonuses and tips, temporary work, real estate 
income, other property income (bank interest, bond interest, stock dividends, etc.), 
various forms of transfers.  Spending includes both non-durable and durable goods, but 
not home purchases.     
 
The surveys do not follow the same households.  Thus comparisons made across groups 
of households involve similar households only.   
 
The surveys were carried out throughout the year, and each interview covered income 
over the current and previous 11 months (disposable annual income, or yilkulgel) and 
spending over the month.  Yilkulgel is annual income (also available on a monthly basis) 




Because surveys are carried out throughout the year for past year income, for all but 
December survey participants, income data refers in part to the prior calendar year.  
Income across households is also not comparable for this reason.  The statistical office, 
TUIK, makes an adjustment to the data to bring households sampled in different months 
on a comparable basis (e.g., for those sampled in January 2005, TUIK applies an 11 
month index, and for those sampled in December 2005, it does not adjust the data).  
Because of this adjustment, and also because income refers to 12 months and spending 
only to the last month, income and spending will not be strictly comparable and there will 
be measurement error at the individual level as a result of the procedure, to the extent 
there is inflation.  Saving will be overestimated for those sampled early in the year 
(because inflation means spending will be low early in the year) and underestimated for 
those sampled late in the year.  An equal number of participants were sampled every 
month, so on average spending should be measured accurately. However, there will still 
be bias for the sample as a whole to the extent that income does not accurately capture 
that year’s income.   
 
Monthly income data is available which is directly comparable to spending data from a 
timing point of view, so an option would be to obtain saving based on this data.  One 
would first have to add imputed rents minus fines and fees and regular cash transfers to 
other families, since these are not included in the monthly income data (but data is 
available on an annual basis).  However, monthly income data seems unreasonably low, 
when compared to annual incomes.  In some 100 cases, in 2008, annualized monthly 
                                                 
58 Disposable income, yilkulgel is calculated as  (topgelyl+imputed rent - fines and fees – cash transfers to 
family members)xinflation index, where topgelyl is past 12 month income.   
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family incomes (topgelayx12 aggregated by family) were less than half reported income 
over the past 12 months (topgelyl aggregated by family).  We checked our results on 
monthly data, by constructing an equivalent to yilkulgel as monthly income (topgelay 
aggregated by family) plus 1/12 of imputed rent-fines and fees –  transfers to family 
members.  Calculating saving using this measure of disposable monthly income and the 
same month’s spending, we found similar results to those reported in the paper, though 
the goodness of fit and statistical significance of coefficients in the saving equation was 
less.   
 
Another issue with the data is under-reporting of income, given the existence of a large 
underground economy coupled with concerns that the survey data might be shared with 
the tax authorities.  Indeed, Yukseler and Turkan (2007) document major discrepancies 
between national accounts data and household survey data on disposable income, and the 
recent revisions to the NIA make the discrepancy even larger.  In our data, this translates 
into saving rates that are sometimes implausibly large and negative, in particular for 
(apparently) low-income households.  This issue is described in more detail in Van 
Rijckeghem and Ucer (2009).   87 
Appendix 2. Istanbul Stock Exchange Data 
 
We calculate retained earnings, cash basis for two samples—a fixed sample of 220 firms 
continuously listed since 1998, and the full sample of listed firms (sample varies from 
year to year).   The original data refers to profits in a given year and dividends paid out 
on the basis of these profits (see Table below).  These dividends are paid out the next 
year (usually in May), after being set during the companies’ annual meetings.  The 
contribution of corporate saving to national saving should therefore be measured as net 
profits in a given year minus dividends paid out that year (on the basis of prior year 
results).  The latter corresponds to prior year dividends in the Table below.  
 
The raw data used to calculate corporate saving (retained earnings) is as follows.   
 
Table xx.  Corporate Profits and Dividends, Raw Data (Million TL)
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
All firms listed on ISE
Net profits 1.25E+09 2.11E+09 2.27E+09 -3.82E+09 4.30E+09 6.85E+09 1.18E+10 1.02E+10 1.89E+10 3.58E+09 2.21E+10
Cash dividend 4.14E+08 6.00E+08 6.65E+08 6.56E+08 9.33E+08 1.84E+09 3.91E+09 5.15E+09 7.18E+09 7.58E+09 8.89E+09
Stock dividend 1.48E+08 6.99E+08 4.01E+08 2.41E+08 3.79E+08 4.23E+08 5.32E+08 6.70E+08 8.32E+08 1.47E+09 2.44E+09
Continuously on ISE since 1998
Net profits 1.2E+09 1.9E+09 2.3E+09 -2.5E+09 4.2E+09 7.3E+09 8.3E+09 6.4E+09 1.3E+10 2.0E+10 1.3E+10
Cash dividend 3.8E+08 5.4E+08 5.9E+08 4.7E+08 7.4E+08 1.5E+09 3.2E+09 3.5E+09 4.5E+09 4.8E+09 2.7E+09
Stock dividend 1.4E+08 6.8E+08 3.7E+08 1.9E+08 3.8E+08 2.7E+08 1.8E+08 3.0E+08 5.9E+08 1.0E+09 1.1E+09 
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Simple Correlation Coefficients
Private Sav       priv -1 Public S unad Public Savings (%   pubS1.34 obaladj realint primbudbalGDP defl%gdppcgr confidence tot tot% credit/gdp change creUR
Private Sav       1
priv -1 0.7 1.0
Public S un -0.5 -0.5 1.0
Public Savi     -0.3 -0.3 0.9 1.0
pubS1.34 -0.3 -0.3 0.9 1.0 1.0
obaladj -0.8 -0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.0
realint 0.0 0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 1.0
primbudbal -0.6 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 0.7 1.0
GDP defl% 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.6 1.0
gdppcgr -0.3 -0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 -0.1 1.0
confidence -0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 -0.3 0.9 1.0
tot 0.8 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.2 -0.6 -0.4 -0.8 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.0
tot% 0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4 1.0
credit/gdp -0.6 -0.7 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.6 0.0 0.4 -0.7 -0.2 0.0 -0.7 -0.1 1.0
change cre -0.7 -0.7 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.7 -0.1 0.4 -0.5 0.4 0.4 -0.4 0.2 0.6 1.0
UR -0.5 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.4 0.0 0.3 -0.8 -0.2 0.0 -0.7 0.0 0.6 0.3 1
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Correlation Between Log Income, Instruments for Income and Measurement Error 
 
                   low savings dummy  log income  hot water  roomsperoecd 
      
              low savings dummy (proxy for mst error)  1 
            log income  -0.17  1 
          hot water dummy  -0.11  0.52  1 
        Roomsperoecd  -0.04  0.20  0.26  1 
                       
    Based on 2008 data, 4948 observations 
            Low savings dummy equals one when dissaving is 100% of income or more and is a proxy for 
    measurement error.  Hot water dummy and rooms per adult equivalent member are instruments for log income 
 
             
         
           
         




                   




                   








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 3158.47 1579.235 436.4798089 9.13313E-44
Residual 80 289.4493 3.618117
Total 82 3447.919
Coefficientstandard Erro t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 4.4108 0.439543 10.03496 8.26277E-16 3.536080452 5.285519 3.53608 5.285519
12-month backward e 0.296233 0.047193 6.277052 1.67048E-08 0.202315865 0.39015 0.202316 0.39015
12-month forward ex- 0.399262 0.022761 17.54171 3.81158E-29 0.353966751 0.444557 0.353967 0.444557
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Appendix 5.  Main Results from Loayza, et. al. (2000b) 
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Appendix 6.  Data Sources, Definitions, and Data Transformations 
 
SPO:  private and public saving as percent of GDP; GDP forecast for 2009; GDP deflator 
forecast for 2009.   
  
Overall balance.  Scaled by GDP.  We adjusted GDP upward by 34% during 1988-1997 
to be consistent with the NIA revisions of 2007.  
 
Inflation adjustment, World Bank (1998) method.  See Van Rijckeghem and Ucer (2009) 
for details for the Turkish case. We scale the inflation adjustments with GDP from the 
revised 2007 NIA.  For years before 1998, we use historical data for GDP scaled up by 
34%, which is the size of the NIA revision to 1998 data. 
 
CBRT Banking System Credit Volume:  Average monthly credit stock divided by GDP.  
For 2009, only 3 quarters of data were available.  4
th quarter credit stock was set equal to 
3
rd quarter credit stock.  2009 GDP forecast from SPO.  1987-1997 GDP scaled upward 
by 1.34 to take into account findings of 2007 NIA revision. 
 
Turkstat:  annual unemployment rate; For 2009, 4
th quarter unemployment rate was set 
equal to 3
rd quarter unemployment rate.  
 
Population growth for 2009 set at 2008 levels 
 
Terms of trade (export unit prices/import unit prices):  from WEO 
 
Real sector confidence index.  2009 based on average of 11 months. 
 
12 month deposit rate—last 10 months for 2009   95 
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